By Sean Healy
Talks supposedly aimed at delivering peace in northern Ireland began on June 10. Initially supposed to be genuinely all party, the talks have been threatened by the British government's refusal to allow representatives of the republican party, Sinn Féin, to participate.
As Sinn Féin was locked out of the talks, its leaders held a press conference outside the gates of Stormont, itself a symbol of British domination.
The British government has continually stated that it will not allow Sinn Féin to participate until it negotiates a reinstatement of the Irish Republican Arm's cease-fire. Representatives of Ulster unionist parties, including Ian Paisley's far-right Democratic Unionist Party, have refused to participate in talks with Sinn Féin at all until it unequivocally "renounces violence" and surrenders.
The promise of talks was a major part of the "peace process" which began with the IRA's cease-fire in August 1994 and the Downing Street Declaration by the British and Irish governments that followed. The talks themselves were proposed to involve all major parties in northern Ireland, and the Irish and British governments, in seeking a solution to the now 30-year-old "troubles".
Any initial hopes have been rapidly diminished over the last two years by Britain's intransigence on the question of arms, and its attempt to use the peace process to force an unconditional surrender by the IRA. Participation in the talks has been Britain's major bargaining piece with Sinn Féin and the republican movement. This approach by Britain, more than any other factor, has limited any progress in talks and threatens to torpedo them now.
Britain has maintained its position in spite of international pressure and criticism. Calls have come from the Dublin government and from US politicians such as Senator George Mitchell for a two-track process, with the issue of arms decommissioning separated from the talks themselves. The Mitchell Commission, which submitted its recommendations late last year, called explicitly for such a process. Britain has chosen to ignore these recommendations.
The IRA has stated that it will not surrender its weapons until it is confident of real and lasting change in northern Ireland. It was frustration at Britain's position that led to the IRA ending its 16-month cease-fire in February, an event which, ironically, spurred Britain to finally set a date for the beginning of all-party talks.
Britain's refusal to allow Sinn Féin to participate in the talks has looked even more foolish since the announcement of the results of a poll held in northern Ireland on May 30. In the poll, to elect party representatives to the talks, Sinn Féin received its highest ever vote in the north, enough to give it 17 seats in the 110-seat assembly.
The result makes Sinn Féin the fourth largest party at the talks, behind the Ulster Unionist Party, Paisley's Democratic Unionist Party and the moderate nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). Sinn Féin won 45% support within the northern Irish nationalist community, and four of the five seats in the nationalist working-class area of West Belfast.
Sinn Féin leaders, including president Gerry Adams, have pointed to the poll result as a mandate for their participation in talks, regardless of whether the IRA declares a new cease-fire.
Speaking several days before the May 30 poll, Adams said, "This is an election that we did not want. But we decided to fight it and if we win we will demand that John Major honour his word and allow our electoral mandate to give us a clear and automatic way in to all-party talks."
The result may also apply increased pressure on Sinn Féin to negotiate a new IRA cease-fire. Recent poll results indicate that, while a majority favour Sinn Féin's participation in talks, an overwhelming 98% support a new cease-fire. One newly elected Sinn Féin representative, Gerry Kelly, said, "The clear message we got [during the election campaign] was that people wanted conflict resolution through all-party talks".
But the question which is starting to come to fore with the start of the talks is even more fundamental: what can they achieve? Until now, the entire focus has been on the criteria for participation. There has been very little public discussion as to what should actually be talked about.
The British government has attempted to direct the whole process into one that deals with security alone, to the virtual exclusion of questions on the future of Britain's presence in northern Ireland. Downing Street has never envisaged that this will be a process similar to talks in South Africa or the Middle East, with major changes emerging from them. And the Dublin government has generally gone along with this agenda, though in a fashion more designed to bring the republican movement along with it.
Sinn Féin has submitted a list of issues which should be discussed, including the fate of political prisoners in British jails, the status of the notorious Royal Ulster Constabulary and housing and employment in the nationalist community. Without motion on at least some of these issues, Sinn Féin would seem to have little motive to negotiate a new IRA cease-fire.
There are still possible constitutional mechanisms that may be negotiated. Similar processes led to agreements at Sunningdale in 1974 and at Hillsborough in 1985 for a form of "power sharing" between the British and Irish governments and the unionist and nationalist parties. One proposal currently floated includes a "Council of Ireland", a consultative body aimed primarily at getting Dublin to bear partial responsibility for the north.
However, in both these cases, "power sharing" foundered either on unionist opposition or on a more general failure to address the deep-running inequalities between nationalist and unionist communities which are the real basis for the "troubles". It is unlikely that any "Council of Ireland" would be more successful if it did not also involve a commitment to British withdrawal and the eventual reunification of Ireland.
Present concern for what the talks can achieve is deepened by the situation of the John Major government. Major's Tory government, with a current majority of one, is dependent on the support of Ulster Unionist MPs in the House of Commons. The need for such support seems to be one of the factors behind Major's intransigence on the issue of Sinn Féin participation in talks.