ACEH: Peace agreement reached but hurdles remain

July 27, 2005
Issue 

James Balowski, Jakarta

A historic peace agreement has been reached between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) following a fifth round of negotiations in Helsinki, Finland, which ended on July 17. But strong opposition to the deal remains among the Indonesia's lawmakers and, if past experience is anything to go by, the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) mill attempt to sabotage the agreement.

On July 20, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono ordered the TNI to halt its military operations against GAM and suggested that TNI troops should remain in their barracks while the peace agreement is being finalised.

The full peace accord is to be signed in Aceh on August 15. Former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, who mediated the talks, told Associated Press on July 17 that he assumed outside monitors would be present for the signing. He urged both sides to stop fighting by then. "All hostilities have to end with the signing", Ahtisaari said. "'They're unfortunately still going on."

In a joint statement, the two sides said the preliminary agreement covers political participation, human rights issues, an amnesty for GAM members, security arrangements and a disputes settlement body. It also includes the establishment of a monitoring mission of 300 unarmed observers from the European Union and the Association of South-East Asian Nations. Early in the talks, GAM dropped its demand for independence for the province of 4 million people and agreed instead to "self-governance" within the Republic of Indonesia.

Under the agreement, TNI troops withdrawals will start in September and be completed by December 31, reducing the number of TNI troops in Aceh from 35,000 to 13,000, and the number of Indonesian police from 15,000 to 10,000. That will leave 23,000 Indonesian security personnel in Aceh.

On the question of political participation, there has been conflicting statements over what form this will take. The major sticking point during the talks was GAM's demand to that Acehnese provincial political parties be legally recognised. This was strongly opposed by members of the Indonesian parliament. Indonesian electoral laws deny recognition to provincial parties. To be legally recognised, a party must have its headquarters in Jakarta and representation in half of the country's 32 provinces — something that is virtually impossible for GAM to achieve.

The Indonesian negotiators initially said they only agree to "former" GAM rebels being able to participate in Acehnese provincial elections if they joined existing parties. Jakarta has now reportedly agreed to change either the electoral laws or the law on special autonomy for Aceh to allow for recognition of Aceh-only based parties.

GAM spokesperson Bakhtiar Abdullah in Helsinki told Reuters on July 18 that the rebels had taken a chance on the deal with Jakarta "because we want to give the people of Aceh a chance to rebuild after the devastating tsunami and to provide them with the opportunity to determine their own internal affairs". But, he added, "this leap of faith is not without risks, and we now require the Indonesian government to exercise full authority over the Indonesian military in order to allow this process to succeed".

Secret war

Indonesia has been waging a secret war against the Acehnese people since GAM declared Aceh's independence in 1976. Between 1990 and 1998, Jakarta declared the oil-rich province a "Military Operations Area". In that period, some 12,000 people — mostly unarmed civilians — were killed by the Indonesian security forces.

In December 2003, Jakarta and GAM signed the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement which required both sides to begin demilitarisation within two months and a Joint Security Committee (JSC) was created to monitor the agreement.

Jakarta however complained that GAM was taking advantage of the cease-fire to build up its guerrilla forces and following a series of attacks by TNI-backed militia on the JSC offices, peace monitors were forced to leave.

Then, on May 18, 2004, Jakarta sabotaged the peace process by arresting five GAM negotiators and introducing new conditions which GAM could not possibly agree to and which were never covered in the original the agreement.

Claiming that GAM was refusing to talk about "substantive issues", then-President Megawati Sukarnoputri placed Aceh under martial law and authorised the TNI to launched a new military offensive against GAM.

Although martial law later replaced by a state of civil emergency, military operations continued and rights groups say that thousands have been killed, disappeared or imprisoned during this period. Reports of torture, abductions and rape are widespread and the province is now the most corrupt in the country.

The TNI has also been accused of disrupting relief post-tsunami operations by restricting the movement of foreign aid workers, hoarding and reselling humanitarian aid and harassing local aid groups.

Elite opposition

The most vocal opposition to July 17 agreement has come from the Megawati's Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). But opposition has also been expressed from other MPs, who are simply using the issue to attack the government.

The major criticism of the agreement within the Indonesian political elite is that it could open the way for the formation of political parties based on religion (which actually already exist) or ethnicity. However, this is merely a cover for the elite critics real concern — losing control of the electoral process.

This year Indonesia held the first direct regional elections, but the process remains tightly controlled by the big parties.

Under the current law, a party or group of parties with at least 15% of the vote or seats in the local legislature must nominate only "independent" candidates. However, there have been reports of candidates "contributing" as much as 1 billion rupiah (about US$100,000) to be nominated. Local political parties are a threat to this control. It was this fear that lead to a deal by most of the major parties except the PDI-P to support the nomination of "former" GAM members as their candidates in Aceh — a concession GAM rejected.

The TNI has most to loose from an end to the conflict in Aceh. Only 30% of the TNI's budget is funded by the government and the shortfall is made up from various military-run businesses and from illegal activities such as drug dealing, illegal logging, extortion, prostitution, gambling and smuggling. Carrying out such illegal activities requires a major troop presence on the ground, so maintaining an atmosphere of uncertainty, violence and tension — or in Aceh, all-out war — is a necessity for the TNI.

Late last year it was reported that the military operation in Aceh had cost Jakarta some US$3 billion since martial law was imposed. In late June the TNI requested an additional US$55 million for its Aceh operations.

The government's motives for supporting the peace process are complex and reflect divisions within the ruling elite.

The Aceh conflict became the focus of international attention when the province was struck by the December 26 tsunami. Which left about 165,000 people dead or missing. Foreign aid workers poured into the formerly closed province, leading to pressure on Jakarta to halt its counter-insurgency war.

Billions of dollars of international aid has been committed to Indonesia. But donors are concerned that the rehabilitation and reconstruction process will be jeopardised by a continuation of the conflict in Aceh. Jakarta stands to loose these funds if it cannot peacefully resolve the conflict.

Despite TNI's public bluster, its military operation against GAM has failed. It has only intensified the Acehnese people's hatred of the TNI and Jakarta's rule. Given Indonesia's weak and stagnating economy, the financial burden of the war has simply becoming unsustainable.

Jakarta has also been lobbying hard to convince Washington to fully restore military ties arguing that the TNI has reformed and is coming under civilian control. Aceh is one of the places where the TNI is most out of control and unless the war stops, there is little chance of establishing any kind of meaningful civilian control over the TNI.

Even before the deal was made, the TNI has been preparing the ground to negate the promised troop withdrawals.

On July 7, the Detik news website reported that Ermaya Suradinata, the head of a TNI think-tank, had said On that if "non-organic" (i.e., non-Acehnese) TNI troops are withdrawn from Aceh they must be reinforced by "organic" (Acehnese) TNI troops.

Eleven days later, the head of the TNI, General Endriartono Sutarto, warned that troops would be returned to Aceh if GAM does not surrender all its weapons within the agreed three-month period. "We will see their commitment. If the reality in the field is different, we will send back military troops to Aceh. It is that simple", he old the Antara state news agency.

From Green Left Weekly, July 27, 2005.
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