Cuba's battle for socialist renewal
By Rafael Hernandez
HAVANA — "What will happen when Castro dies?" That's the inevitable question I'm invited to talk about on Cuba overseas. Curiously enough, I also get a repeated question from the most diverse Cuban audiences when I'm invited to talk about relations between Cuba and the United States within the island: "What will happen when the United States lifts its blockade against us?".
It occurs to me that these two questions illustrate the intersection of perspectives that mark the different ways of thinking about Cuba's present and future, and about its relations with the outside world, especially Latin America and the US.
Behind the question about the supposed consequences of Fidel's mortality lies an insinuation that he is what explains the existence of socialism in the country. The corollary thus follows: whenever he goes the system will predictably fall apart, just as in the countries of Eastern Europe.
However, looking at Cuba through Eastern European lenses can lead to certain blunders, such as those committed by some politicians or "Cubanologists" who, when talking about the leaders of the so-called human rights groups on the island, think they are dealing with Lech Walesa or Vaclav Havel. Or who refer to Cardinal Jaime Ortega, not as if he were the archbishop of Havana, but the archbishop of Cracow and a future pope.
This transposition of scenarios is not only geographical and historical, but also cultural. And it inevitably loses sight of the political culture of that real country which is Cuba.
US policy towards Cuba
With the end of the Cold War, the democratic argument emerged as the only one in Washington's policy towards the island. Other problems, such as the Cuban-Soviet alliance or Havana's relations with Latin American and African revolutionary movements, disappeared.
In this way, we saw a sort of primordial regression to the initial moments of the conflict. The central problem again became the original one: the very existence of the revolutionary regime.
North American policy maintains that the Cuban system is essentially anti-democratic. However, its demands presuppose that this can, in theory at least, be "corrected" by opening up to a schema that would allow "a peaceful transition, via a democratic institutional set-up, to a successor government". In short, democratic elections, human rights and a "market" economy are not a desirable model, but the means to change the ruling political and social regime in Cuba and replace it with one that complies with universal North American standards.
However, it has to be asked to what extent US policy towards Cuba bears the hallmarks of democracy. Let's look at some of its features.
1. US policy towards Cuba does not enjoy popular support. According to opinion polls, the majority opinion in the country — independent of views on the Cuban regime — favours a more normal relationship with the island.
2. US policy towards Cuba discriminates against its own citizens. Various social sectors, included business, the churches, non-governmental organisations and recently even members of Congress and the governors of important states like Illinois, have spoken out against a policy that prevents them from visiting Cuba and from establishing free relations with the government, institutions and people of the island.
3. The position of the US government has favoured the right-wing sector of Cuban-US emigrants, the most elitist and exclusionist, representative of upper-class and annexationist trends. This sector enjoys access to powerful media sources and has connections right up to the US Congress, as well as with certain Latin American parties and governments.
It also has financial and political resources that are used, among other things, to support and project internationally the domestic opposition in the island. In contrast, a sizeable proportion of Cuban emigrants since the 1960s lack any sort of democratic political representation.
4. The blockade, the hostility, the threats and the extreme ideologisation are not compatible with the character and intention of democracy, nor with related issues such as human rights, given that democratic norms like dialogue and cooperation are not being followed.
5. This policy refuses to recognise any change that might take place in Cuba, despite it involving an expansion of freedoms or a step along the road of reform. The 1992 constitutional reform and the economic measures that have been implemented since the summer of 1993, such as the reformulation of property law, the shift of the major part of agriculture into private hands, the growth of self-employment, the opening of free markets, the growth of foreign investment and the end of discrimination towards religious believers, among other measures: all this counts for nothing in the eyes of the US government.
Only if Cuba were to act in a way that legitimised those criteria laid down as non-negotiable by the US itself would that government agree to deal. And any doubts as to what sort of changes the US proposes to implement in Cuba have definitely been resolved by the amendments to the Helms-Burton Act. [These amendments aim to restore property nationalised under the revolution to its original owners and to make any foreign firm that collaborates in the use of such assets liable to prosecution for damages under US law].
Cuban policy
Cuban policy towards the US is basically dictated by a defensive logic. With the end of the Cold War, this logic, far from growing weaker, has intensified.
The perception of national insecurity has become more acute because of the economic crisis. This translates into a feeling of vulnerability before a renewed threat, not only to the political regime but to the Cuban social order as well. Everything that could influence the stability of the country, including internal order and security, has acquired an increased political charge.
The main features of this situation affect a democratic paradigm in different ways. Let's look at them in summary form.
1. The majority of Cubans perceive that Washington has unilaterally imposed punishment — such as the blockade and difficulties in getting access to their families in the US — which restricts their freedom and right to self-determination, the fundamental premises of a working democracy.
2. Independently of the lack of an immediate military threat, the continuation of the North American siege, along with its aim of interfering in Cuba's domestic affairs, acts to maintain a defensive attitude.
3. This view of US persecution has intensified with the end of the socialist camp, the economic crisis and the stepped-up ideological campaign against Cuba. The consequence of this encirclement — a siege mentality — does not contribute to the strengthening of democracy nor to a greater acceptance of pluralism on the island.
4. The weakened domestic consensus which is a product of the crisis exacerbates the perception of the threat to internal stability that US policies cause. This in turn produces less tolerance, flexibility and capacity for dialogue before expressions of political disagreement.
5. The perception of the threat represented by the exile community gets intensified to the degree that not only its rhetoric but its belligerence too is increasing. This is not limited to peaceful activities, nor to ideological jousts, but involves all sorts of actions, including terrorism and destabilisation.
6. The Cuban viewpoint about the ideologisation of the theme of democracy and the uses to which it is put by the US gets reinforced. Paradoxically, the policies of external pressure, stimulated in particular by the US add fuel to the flames of conservatism on the island. They have the effect of strengthening the position of those who disagree with the continued implementation of certain reforms, on the basis that these could be perceived as concessions to the enemies of the revolution.
These policies and ideological campaigns also generate in some Cubans a sort of allergic reaction to terms like "market", "human rights", "pluralism", "civil society", "democracy" and "transition". To a certain degree this is a manifestation of the defensive logic towards the US, one that is to be explained not only on the basis of the objective conjuncture of insecurity, but also as the psycho-social and ideological residue left by four decades of conflict.
Questions of democracy
All of the above provides little reason for an optimistic prognosis. To the extent that the conditions imposed by Washington's military hostility and the tolerated virulence of Miami are maintained, the defensive Cuban stance has little reason to change.
However, it would be worthwhile to think again about that second question: what would a post-blockade Cuba be like? On what terms could different political positions coexist, within a shared framework of independence, sovereignty and self-determination, free of Washington's persecution? Would there be space, under different circumstances, for a loyal opposition? Who in Cuba would represent that loyal opposition?
Despite everything and despite the siege mentality, there exists today in Cuban thinking greater freedom of expression, pluralism and vitality than in the days when certain present-day leaders of opposition groups used to teach Soviet-style "Marxism-Leninism" and celebrate the formulae and political customs of the "really existing socialism" of Eastern Europe.
Who has formed the critical conscience that has driven these changes? The political groups supported by Washington or Miami? Or those who defend a participatory democracy, the stimulation of disagreement, the spread of a new thinking, the search for creative political formulae and the practice of criticism and debate as a road to transformation and transition within a profoundly renewed Cuban socialism?
The answers are to be found, of course, in Cuba.
[Rafael Hernandez is the editor of the Cuban journal Temas. A slightly longer version of this article first appeared in the Mexican daily Reforma. Translation by Dick Nichols.]