By John Tomlinson and Rob Wesley-Smith
There are significant economic and political reasons why the federal Labor cabinet should reassess its position on East Timor. These reasons need to be placed within a historical context. If the Keating government perseveres with present policies, it will imperil the economic future of generations of Australians and undermine our human rights record. Far more importantly in the eyes of Labor backbenchers, its current policies will play a significant part in its losing government.
The background
Four hundred years of Portuguese rule in East Timor, though challenged by a number of uprisings, remained unbroken until the Japanese invaded in 1942. More than 40,000 Timorese died resisting Japanese efforts to capture withdrawing Australian troops and as a result of their fight for their own country, which held up the Japanese assault on Australia.
From the end of the second world war until the mid-1970s, Timor became a tourist destination for Australians wanting an inexpensive overseas holiday. It remained a typical backwoods colony until after the Carnation Revolution in Portugal on April 25, 1974, when a new government began to facilitate the East Timorese moving towards independence.
The independence movement was split. The UDT was supported predominantly by the Chinese community, conservative traditional village leaders and those Timorese who had become incorporated as part of the colonial elite. Their major opposition was Fretilin, a mass-based progressive party, which drew most of its support from the major towns and the countryside. There was also the Apodeti party, which proposed integration within Indonesia. During a visit by one of the authors in 1974, he was told by an Apodeti supporter that the party had only 12 members.
During 1974-75 Indonesia initiated Operation Komodo, a widespread campaign to destabilise East Timor. In August 1975, Indonesian pressure encouraged the UDT leadership to launch a pre-emptive military campaign against Fretilin. Fighting between UDT and Fretilin resulted in some 2000 deaths. The Portuguese attempted to get representatives of the three parties to a peace conference in Macau. Fretilin did not attend, but as a result of increasing Indonesian incursions declared independence from Portugal on November 28, 1975.
Since December 7, 1975, when Indonesia invaded East Timor, Australian governments have acquiesced in the attempted annexation.
The death toll, as calculated by Amnesty International and the Catholic Church, is between 200,000 and a quarter of a million Timorese. These are conservative estimates; the actual death toll may well be over 300,000. The deaths were a result of military engagements, famine which followed the invasion (especially in 1979) and continuing political killings by the Indonesian military intent on stamping out any opposition.
There are more than 12 Indonesian battalions currently stationed in the former Portuguese colony. Their prime function is to stamp out any dissent against Indonesian colonisation of this territory, advance Jakarta's transmigration agenda and safeguard the interests of the generals who now control the coffee and other industries in East Timor.
Repression is a daily occurrence. It takes many forms: the arrest and jailing for three years of students who unfurled a Timor flag in July 1994, and the jailing for life of students who organised the peaceful memorial march for Sebastian Gomes. This march on November 12, 1991, led to Indonesian troops killing more than 200 students at the Santa Cruz Cemetery in Dili and the deaths of a further 300 in the aftermath.
These are the few stories which have been covered by Western media. The ongoing disappearances, the use of Timorese civilians who at gunpoint are forced to walk in front of Indonesian soldiers trying to sweep Falintil resistance fighters from the mountains, the rape and torture of suspected supporters of an independent East Timor are not part of the Western media record, despite the continuing efforts of journalists John Pilger, Amy Goodman, Max Stahl, Bob Domm, Alan Nairn and many Portuguese colleagues.
The church
East Timor is predominantly a Catholic country and the church, under the leadership of Bishop Carlos Belo, has attempted to shield its flock from the worst excesses of Indonesian repression. But its power is substantially curtailed. It was unable to prevent Indonesian troops invading the Motael Church in Dili and murdering Sebastian Gomes in October 1991. It has been unsuccessful in getting details from the Indonesian military on the 300 people who disappeared following the initial Dili massacre.
Church spokespeople report that in June Indonesian soldiers desecrated a mass and in July Indonesian youths harassed nuns at the Timor University. Following this latter incident, several disturbances were violently dispersed, leading to minor injuries (Indonesian military version) or the deaths of some demonstrators (church version).
On July 19, Bishop Belo claimed that Timor has become a living hell for Christians. From Jakarta, Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas warned the bishop against making such statements.
The Catholic Church outside East Timor has generally been unsupportive of its isolated and harassed colleagues inside. While the pope retains direct control of the diocese, his public speeches and actions have given little comfort. Presumably church leaders are fearful of being barred from working in Indonesia proper.
With the exception of the Catholic Commission on Justice and Peace, it took the Dili massacre to shake most Australian church leaders from their lethargy. Despite the lead given by Melbourne's Bishop Hilton Deakin, the Northern Territory Diocese has done little to help Bishop Belo.
Political misadventure
This backdrop would be well known to Canberra politicians. What may be less well appreciated is that Australia has consistently misjudged political developments in Indonesia since 1949.
In 1949 Australia's standing in Indonesia was particularly high as a result of wharfies' bans on ships supplying the Dutch colonialists in their fight against Indonesian nationalists. The 1949 Australian election removed the pro-independence Labor government, replacing it with Menzies' Liberals. The Liberals militarily opposed Indonesia during Sukarno's confrontation period. The Menzies government failed to communicate much to the parliamentary leaders in Indonesia apart from its aloof belief in its own racial superiority.
In 1965 a combined CIA and indigenous generals' coup overthrew Sukarno and let loose an internecine spree which killed 1 million people who were termed communists. The dead's real crime may have been to be Chinese, rich, offside with village leaders, members of minority religious groups, poor, criminal or simply expendable.
This murderous orgy enforced obedience, and the generals manoeuvred to ensure it was obedience to them. Indonesian military officers have used their positions to own or control vast commercial wealth. This combination of the military and industrial sector increases compliance and subservience and has worked to sustain the Javanese junta for nearly 30 years.
In 1972 Gough Whitlam, declaring "It's Time", won the election and began to sweep away the cobwebs of 23 years of Liberals. In Australian politics the term Whitlamite conjures up the image of a big-spending reform-minded government. But when it came to our closest neighbour, apart from Papua New Guinea, Whitlam and his successor Malcolm Fraser were prepared to sacrifice Timorese to Whitlam's concept of geopolitics. This fancy name, in current CIA jargon means realpolitik within a sphere of influence. Either way, it means might is right.
In 1975 the Cold War was in full swing. The CIA had backed the Java generals (after all they had killed a million commies). The US had nuclear submarines which might need to use the Timor Trench, a deep channel linking the Indian and Pacific oceans. The US, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, did not want any upstart little country falling into the socialist sphere of influence.
Australian policy towards Indonesia has been based on the erroneous belief that for the foreseeable future the Indonesian military will be at least the real power behind the government. Such thinking denies the possibility of the emergence of a democratic government and ignores the real possibility that the current military junta could be overthrown by internal dissension.
If the Australian government were not so blinkered, it would be doing all within its power to develop an enduring friendship with the democratic forces emerging within Indonesian society.
Australian governments may have been happy to go along with Indonesia's annexation of East Timor solely because of unreal political concepts such as geopolitics, and the fact they did not want to pick a fight with such a populous neighbour, but there was a sweetener to the deal.
Oil
Australian and Indonesian seismic surveys had revealed excellent oil exploration prospects in the Timor Sea. Throughout 1974, BP Australia had been negotiating with Portuguese and Timorese representatives about oil drilling concessions near Timor. Within days of Indonesia invading East Timor, BP was attempting to negotiate with Indonesian officials. The Australian-Indonesian Business Committee strongly urged business as usual.
After prolonged negotiations and Australian government statements recognising East Timor's integration into Indonesia, Australia and Indonesia agreed to a carve-up of the oil resources in the Timor Sea.
The Portuguese, who are recognised by the United Nations as the decolonisation authority in East Timor, and the Timorese representatives in exile, do not accept that the East Timorese claim to their oil has been extinguished. They have taken a claim for damages against Australia in the World Court. (No claim has been lodged against Indonesia because it does not recognise the World Court.)
The claim is likely to succeed, potentially laying Australians open to damages pay-outs in the order of billions of dollars. BHP, through subsidiaries like Petroz, will have pocketed and laundered the profits. This will leave the Australian people with the debt — an example of capitalism's capacity to privatise profits and socialise losses.
Political fallout
The balance of payment and budget deficit difficulties which losing this case in the World Court could have on the government of the day would damage any electoral hopes it might have. Government outlays in health, education, social security and community services would be slashed. Superannuees might find that many tax advantages they anticipated could evaporate.
The case brought by three Australian Timorese in the High Court on August 9 questioned the Australian government's right to enter into a treaty with an illegitimate occupying power in East Timor. The High Court found against the Timorese, but made the point that it did not have the authority to consider the legitimacy of the treaty. The High Court's decision indicates that there are no legal structures in Australia which have the capacity to prevent governments entering into international treaties or engaging in foreign policy activities which are in breach of international law or morality.
There is developing in the public mind a sense of the unsavoury nature of our relationship with the generals in Jakarta. This is reinforced by recent statements by our defence minister about joint arms manufacture, despite US Congressional bans imposed because of US alarm about human rights violations by Indonesia. The crackdown on freedom of speech, independent trade unionists and journalists throughout Indonesia increases Australians' sense of unease.
East Timorese independence is one of those issues which has strong supporters in all ALP factions, throughout all parties with representatives in the Australian parliament and amongst an extraordinarily diverse range of voters. Like unemployment, Aboriginal issues and health policies, Timor is an issue which considerably influences perceptions of politicians.
Through broadsheets, leaflets, demonstrations, petitions and blockades, Australian supporters of a free East Timor have struggled to get across the facts about Indonesian repression to the wider Australian community.
Worry about the rights and protection of the underdog becomes combined with the recognition of the unattractiveness of powerlessness and the nagging suspicion that might is right. Politicians ignore at their own peril the large number of Australians who are not prepared to forget the injustice, the killings, the extrajudicial executions, the footage of the Dili massacre or Greg Shackleton's last report from Balibo.