The fall of Suharto in May unleashed an unprecedented wave of political discussion and activity in East Timor. Across the island, meetings are being organised to discuss East Timor's future as an independent entity, to debate the proposal of autonomy, to encourage the involvement of the people as a whole in determining their future. The convener of the Sydney Australian East Timor Association, ANDREW McNAUGHTON, recently spent two months in East Timor, attending and filming many of the dialogues. He was interviewed by JANET PARKER.
Question: Can you tell us about the student dialogues in July and August?
The period of reformasi in Indonesia has created a greater chance for people in Timor to express their wishes and aspirations. However, the opportunity to voice their opinions occurred initially only in the urban centres, particularly Dili.
So students of the University of East Timor decided it was necessary to take the dialogues to the 13 regional centres. To facilitate this, they formed the Student Solidarity Council and elected 24 board members to supervise the process.
Having received permission from the military commander and local authorities, they sent students from UNTIM to spend anywhere between one and three days in each regional centre, organising and creating the conditions for a free public discussion. As many as 500 students would attend these dialogues.
In Viqueque, some 2000-2500 people attended the dialogue, and 5000 in Baucau. Virtually the whole town attended the dialogue, as did many from the surrounding countryside, reflecting mass interest. Others were limited or prevented from going ahead at all by military intimidation and threats.
Despite this harassment, the students were successful in carrying out at least 10 dialogues.
Question: What sorts of issues were discussed?
The dialogues were historic and unprecedented since the Indonesian invasion in 1975. The Timorese displayed an extremely strong level of political consciousness — one fostered by 23 years of Indonesian occupation. The main theme was the need for self-determination and independence.
Other issues were the need for the cessation of human rights abuses and intimidation. Connected with that was the frequently reaffirmed call that ABRI [Indonesian armed forces] be removed from East Timor, that UN peacekeepers be introduced, that all East Timorese political prisoners be freed, in particular that Xanana Gusmao be freed to represent the people of East Timor.
What struck me was the degree of unity on the fundamental issues. I never got a sense that civil war is a likely outcome. I had a strong feeling that that is a beat-up by those who have a vested interest in stopping self-determination.
Those who support integration are a tiny minority, against well over 700,000 East Timorese who appear to unanimously want self-determination and independence.
There was some talk about the old divisions between Fretilin and the UDT, but it was discussed in the context of the need for unity — that the move towards democracy should not be jeopardised by these kinds of political divisions.
There was an incredible atmosphere of euphoria — young people holding banners and shouting Viva Xanana, Viva Independencia, Viva Timor Leste, Viva Referendum! Finally, they had a chance to be seen and heard in public.
Question: What is the content of Habibie's autonomy proposal, and how is it viewed by the East Timorese people?
Many of the authorities in Dili, including military people, indicated that they were getting no clear direction from Jakarta about what this autonomy really meant. For them it was business as usual.
My understanding is that it denies any control over the military, the economy or foreign affairs to the East Timorese people. So in reality it is meaningless.
In essence, the Indonesian government is trying to make some cosmetic changes that will placate the international community, take the pressure off while they're vulnerable. The Timorese were very cynical about this autonomy.
Question: Why is Indonesia so determined to hang on to East Timor when many estimate that the cost of holding it is greater than letting it go?
Firstly, they are afraid that if they let East Timor go, it will establish a precedent — that there will be a long line of other regions wanting to secede.
Secondly, there is the need to appease key people in ABRI who still remain committed to the incorporation of East Timor. Some of these people wield a great deal of influence, and some have spent a good deal of their military careers in East Timor.
The argument that they are trying to hang onto the revenue from the Timor Gap is probably fallacious. From our figures, the real cost to the Indonesian economy of hanging on to East Timor is probably half a billion dollars per annum.
The revenues coming from East Timor, in particular the oil revenues, will nowhere near equal the cost of maintaining the occupation.
Question: Most western governments and their press argue that an independent East Timor could not survive economically. Was this question discussed at the dialogues?
The economic discussion was raised by student leader Anterro Bandito Da Silva. He pointed out that nearly 90% of the East Timorese people are self-sufficient farmers.
While ABRI operates in all territories, committing random human rights abuses and making arbitrary arrests, farmers and their families are terrified to go about their agricultural activities. As a result, the overall productivity of the farmers drops.
The removal of ABRI would allow the farmers to go about their activities far more effectively, thereby improving the well-being of the population.
There are some economic questions that would need to be addressed about how the government of an independent East Timor would be funded. The oil revenues would certainly be a big help.
Other areas people are talking about are tourism; coffee could be expanded and fishing and fishing rights could earn significant income. So the argument that East Timor has to stay tethered to Indonesia's apron-strings for economic reasons doesn't really add up.
Question: The Indonesian government recently announced that it had withdrawn all its combat troops. What were your observations of the Indonesian military presence?
I attended the public troop withdrawal staged in Dili at the end of July. This was a farce.
The Indonesians claimed that they were going to withdraw 1000 troops on that day. When the day came, the military were forced to acknowledge that they were withdrawing only 360.
The staged withdrawal occurred in a media-circus atmosphere. Suddenly, all the hotels were full with visiting journalists. A Hercules aircraft full of journalists from Jakarta — mostly Indonesian — was flown in by the Indonesian government the day before the event and out again the day after.
The Timorese were openly sceptical about this, viewing it as a publicity stunt. The timing of this stunt was all-important: it occurred just prior to the release of some major IMF loans and just before the dialogue involving the Indonesian and Portuguese governments and the UN.
Within a week of the journalists' departure, three battalions landed at Com harbour in a remote region of Timor. They were landed at night and marched under cover of darkness towards the eastern tip of East Timor, to Tutuala.
Indonesia didn't even deny that these landings had occurred, but claimed in the local newspaper that they were medical teams being sent to Lospalos for the local population.
Also, the apparent military build-up coincided with increased military presence in Lospalos, increased military activities throughout the region of Lautem, including a major assault, involving some 3000 troops, on Falintil, the East Timorese resistance.
Meanwhile at the western border, consistent stories were heard of somewhere between eight and 11 battalions being moved into regional towns. Simultaneously, there were a series of human rights abuses in those areas.
Reliable resistance sources indicate that the total military presence is some 25,000, double the number the Indonesian government acknowledges.
In May, June and July, there appeared to be a major upsurge in the activity of paramilitary groups. The Indonesian military put a lot of effort into setting up these groups.
The aim was to get local groups of people and pay them to become part of the repression and intimidation. They visited people's houses at night, bashed, arrested and disappeared people — committing the kind of abuses that the Indonesian military would not be wanting to carry out in uniform.
This strategy was set up by General Prabowo, and it is believed that Prabowo himself came to Timor in May to supervise reactivation of the paramilitary groups.
Certainly, when I arrived in Dili, there was a lot of intimidation by "ninjas" on the streets at night. You'd see people hanging around, dressed in dark clothing, with automatic weapons or in some cases wooden clubs.
I also heard that local paramilitary in Suai were going into populated areas at night, throwing rocks at people's houses and using loudhailers daring people to come out. A similar pattern was occurring across Timor.
During the latter part of my stay, it seemed the wind had gone out of their sails. Possibly the funding had run out again, and possibly Prabowo's problems in Jakarta and his discrediting meant that the force behind these paramilitary had weakened.
Question: How is Falintil orienting to the new period?
Falintil has adopted a wait and see attitude. They're certainly not seeking armed conflict.
It appears that the local Indonesian troops mostly do not want to fight with Falintil. Falintil believes that the Indonesians have known where they are on a number of occasions but will avoid conflict where possible.
Falintil has also engaged in radio conversations with local posts where the Indonesian soldiers have complained that they don't have enough food, they don't want to be there, they recognise that Falintil is fighting a just cause and they have no desire to fight with them.
This does not mean that there is no threat to Falintil, because there is a major military assault going on in Lospalos. The point is, though, that the Indonesians will not engage Falintil in small groups.
As I was leaving, there were rumours that there was going to be a major assault against Taur Matan Ruak, and I believe that has occurred.
The position of Falintil is really quite moderate. I believe that they are far more interested in negotiating a political solution to the conflict.
There have been fears expressed that people seen as sympathetic to Indonesia, whether local Timorese or transmigrants, would be targeted and attacked under an independent East Timor. Taur Matan Ruak wrote a letter to the local paper saying that he wanted to assure everyone that human rights would be respected and decisions about who had done wrong and how they should be punished would be handled by a court of law. Falintil would not be exacting vengeance.
Question: The post-Suharto period has brought a huge growth in democratic organising and new political parties in Indonesia. Has there been a similar process in Timor?
There has been a lot more political activity. The old political parties like Fretilin and UDT are meeting to discuss their future, role, strategy and activities. CNRT had about 14 key representatives in East Timor — the new National Council of Timorese Resistance. It involves members of a range of political parties.
Other groups have formed — the Movement for Unity and Reconciliation Amongst Timorese (GRPTT). Its leader is Manuel Carrascalao (formerly UDT), but it also involves members of Fretilin and Apodeti. It aims to encourage progress and movement towards self-determination and a peaceful resolution. It has a fairly significant influence.
A new women's organisation has formed called FOCOPAS, and a new youth organisation called OSKTL, which has links with but is not the same as the Student Solidarity Council from the university. University Graduates for a Referendum has formed, and I believe there is also a new high school student group forming.
Then there are the pre-existing Timorese youth groups like Renetil and OBJECTIL. You have people working with a range of non-government organisations. There have been dialogues between these groups.
Question: Did you see any evidence of links between the pro-democracy forces in Indonesia and those in Timor?
While I was there, a number of Indonesian activists visited. This is something quite historic. Five or six Indonesian activists came and spent time in Timor.
The most public face of this was a solidarity forum, again run by the Student Solidarity Council in Dili towards the end of August. Three Indonesian speakers were invited: Father Romo Mangunuijaya, an Indonesian Catholic priest who has been an outspoken supporter of East Timorese self-determination for some time, Yenni Dhamayanti — an Indonesian pro-democracy activist formerly in exile but returned to Jakarta in May of this year after the fall of Suharto — and Wilson Bin Nurtias, the activist from SPRIM [Indonesians in Solidarity with the Maubere People] who had been jailed with Xanana in Cipinang for his activities on behalf of East Timor.
They spoke of the shared aspirations for justice and democracy and the struggle against the same military machine. They also explained how the Indonesian people had been lied to about East Timor, and this explained why there had not been a greater reaction within Indonesia about the situation in Timor.
This was really quite a historic event, and a very moving one. You could see that the young Timorese who were there had long since transcended the idea that the Indonesians were the enemy. I think it's obvious that the final common pathway for any solution of Timor must involve change in Indonesia.