Pablo Stefanoni is a journalist, editor and author of Has Rebellion Become a Thing of the Right?. Currently based in Paris, he spoke to Green Left’s Federico Fuentes about the rise of the far-right National Rally (RN) in France and how the left stopped it winning the parliamentary elections held over June 30 and July 7.
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What factors explain the rise of RN?
The French far right has been steadily growing within the framework of a double process of normalisation or dédiabolisation (de-demonisation) — from above and from below.
From above, because RN now has 142 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (in 2017 it only had 8) and elected representatives on numerous departmental and municipal councils. Its presence in political institutions has become increasingly “legitimate”.
And from below, because voting RN, and saying so, no longer means being treated as a political pariah.
Generally speaking, the big issue in recent elections has been the cost of living and deterioration of public services, especially in peri-urban and rural France.
But this is being linked to other issues, such as immigration. The far right has constructed a “moral economy” in which immigration is responsible for this deterioration and precarious living conditions.
In terms of RN’s electorate, there is a risk of trying to construct an overly caricatured typical voter. Generally speaking, its voters tend to be less educated and live in the interior of France.
There is an RN vote tied to issues raised by the gilets jaunes (Yellow Vests) protests [of 2018‒19]: the deterioration of public services and sense of being treated with social contempt by the elites.
We should also not forget the existing widespread sentiment of rejection towards traditional politicians and the media’s role, such as the Bolloré group’s channels, which hammer away with an extreme right-wing discourse.
But we should also acknowledge that there are very different realities. In north-east France, there is indeed an RN vote from those who lost out from globalisation in old depressed industrial areas.
Yet RN voters in south-east France — another stronghold — are very different: they are neither unemployed nor afraid of losing their jobs, yet still feel that resources are being distributed unfairly and complain their personal efforts are being held back by taxes.
They are people who are neither poor enough to benefit from social welfare nor rich enough to feel that their future is secure.
Cutting across this in a very complex manner is the question of racism: the idea that people no longer recognise their own country, which has been transformed by multiculturalism. This, in one way or another, is linked to the theory of the “great replacement”.
Marine Le Pen’s decision to put forward 28-year-old Jordan Bardella as party president and candidate for prime minister has refreshed the far right’s image, including on social networks such as TikTok.
All this contributed to its electoral breakthrough. The big question is whether Le Pen will become president in 2027.
The process of de-demonisation has so far not progressed enough for RN to win. But it has progressed enough for it to grow in a way that seemed unimaginable in the past.
What can you tell us about the radical left France Unbowed (LFI), the New Popular Front (NFP) it was part of and its election campaign?
When Macron called surprise early legislative elections, he thought the left would be unable to unite again. Indeed, the left was entangled in various debates, including over Gaza and Ukraine. But the left responded quickly and effectively.
Within 24 hours, it had formed the NFP, which spans from the Socialist Party (PS) through to La France Insoumise (LFI), passing through The Ecologists, the French Communist Party, and even the New Anti-Capitalist Party.
Within 48 hours, united candidates were selected for all 577 constituencies across France.
Within 72 hours, a common program was agreed upon, which is well to the left and took clear positions on Gaza and Ukraine that avoided double standards: condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and supporting Ukrainian resistance; condemning Israel’s massacre in Gaza — as well as Hamas’ October 7 attacks — and recognising a Palestinian state.
It also took clear positions on the need for an economic program to restore public services and workers’ purchasing power.
However, the crisis inside LFI — where [party leader] Jean-Luc Mélenchon operates as a genuine caudillo (party boss) — marred the NFP’s campaign. Instead of talking about their program, NFP candidates from the various parties had to talk about the “Melénchon purges” of two critical LFI MPs who were excluded as candidates.
The LFI’s internal crisis is above all tied to its lack of internal democracy and organisation. For various reasons, Mélenchon, who in 2022 was a great asset for the left in terms of votes, is today a liability — because of his demonisation in the media and his absorbing cult of personality within the movement.
There are also strategic discussions inside LFI, one of which is over how to maintain its influence in multicultural urban peripheries (banlieues) — some of which remain strongholds — without writing off small provincial towns, where the far right is strong.
According to François Ruffin, a leading left figure who was re-elected in a northern French constituency (though only after leaving LFI), the left has “three deficits”: a geographical deficit, in terms of small-town France; a demographic deficit, in terms of the elderly; and a social deficit, in terms of low-income earners.
What is at stake is not just the question of votes, but the “soul” of the left. Putting together “chains of equivalences” to build a socio-political popular bloc is not easy.
But the NFP’s success — no poll placed it first in terms of deputies — was also due to the dynamic it unleashed from below. Grassroots associations — trade unions, neighbourhood, professional and cultural groups, etc — and unaffiliated individuals appropriated the NFP’s acronym and went out to campaign.
Even young people with no previous campaigning experience went house-to-house to convince neighbours not to vote for the far right. This was perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the campaign.
For the second round, it was decided to “form a barrier” against the far right that involved voting for Macronist candidates detested by the left.
The system of constituencies with a second round of voting allows for this: if no one gets a majority, a second round occurs involving those who obtained more than 12.5% of the electoral roll.
This “Republican front” ended up benefiting Macronism and the traditional right more, given they won more deputies than expected thanks to “smart voting” by the left.
More than a great victory, this is an opportunity the left can seize — or miss. But each sector has very different strategic outlooks and political calculations, which complicates unity. We saw this with the difficulties in choosing a prime ministerial candidate. These internal debates threaten to leave NFP voters disappointed.
Of course, it is not a question of naively talking about unity: there are different visions, ranging from the PS to the LFI. The issue is finding common ground for action to process differences in the most democratic way possible.
Can we draw any lessons from France’s Republican front for defeating the radical right?
It is true that democratic cordons sanitaires come with a cost. As part of the Republican front, the French left had to hold its nose and vote for [Macronist] figures such as repressive interior minister Gérald Darmanin and former PM Élisabeth Borne, who is strongly associated with the unpopular pension reform.
The problem is the same in the United States: stopping Trump means allying with mainstream Democrats.
No doubt the far right will use this to demonstrate that they are the ones who represent something “different” and “new”.
Nevertheless, the French left has won in political-moral terms. It led the cordon sanitaire against the far right, which posed a threat to republican equality. But it is a long way from ideologically convincing a majority of the population.
Ideological rearmament is not easy. It will require combining theory and practice. When it comes to its program, the left today has little credibility anywhere.
It seems clear that neither the radical left nor the social democrats can go it alone, and that broad progressive coalitions are needed.
The big question is whether these coalitions can offer responses to the key issues of the day, above all, reversing the crisis of the public sector and providing some certainty about the future.
Beyond its advances and setbacks, new far right forces have managed to capture the mood of the times, the crisis of the future — viewed by many as a mix of dystopian and catastrophist scenarios — and the anxieties of the present.
[Edited and abridged from a much longer interview at links.org.au.]