By Eva Cheng
On March 18, the people of Taiwan will elect a president for the second time in the island's history. Around the time of the last presidential election four years ago, China's government "test fired" missiles near Taiwan to discourage Taiwan's rulers from taking new initiatives towards independence. In the name of guarding Taiwan, the United States sent warships to the vicinity.
This time, Beijing's intimidation has been confined to words. However, it has made clear that it would consider any moves towards independence a "declaration of war" which it "would not ignore".
Beijing has reason to be more worried this time. The prospects of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate, former mayor of Taipei Chen Shui-Bian, winning the presidency are high. The ruling Kuomintang's (KMT) incumbent president, Lee Teng-Hui, cannot constitutionally seek re-election and KMT candidate Lien Chan is not as popular.
Lien's support could be diluted by James Soong Chu-Yu, who was governor of Taiwan until a few years ago and was a long-time KMT leader. Soong was expelled from the KMT late last year for seeking to run in the presidential election as an independent.
KMT power struggle
While Soong has been manoeuvred out of the governor's position by Lee, his open foe in recent years, he enjoys significant sympathy within the KMT. In defiance of Lee, a number of high ranking KMT officials have openly supported Soong's presidential campaign. They include former armed forces chief Huang Hsin-Chiang, who is an ally of KMT elder Hau Pei-Tsun.
Soong had polled ahead of Lien in opinion polls until December. But his popularity started to slide after a KMT legislator accused him of failing to report donations to the KMT when he ran for governor in 1994, to disclose his family assets in the US, and involvement in the transfer of 27.6 million new Taiwanese dollars (about A$1.3 million) into 20 accounts.
While none of the accusations have been proven, few in Taiwan find allegations of this kind against the KMT top brass far-fetched. A saying in Taiwan goes: "The party treasury has a direct tunnel to the national treasury". There have been widespread allegations that KMT splashed millions around to buy votes in previous elections.
The public pressure against the perceived corruption and looting of public wealth by the KMT is so intense that the party recently announced it would put its assets in trust. A recent book by two Taiwanese journalists, which recounts the obscure origins of the KMT's enormous wealth, estimated the party's total assets at NT$600 billion (A$30 billion) and its net worth at NT$200 billion. The KMT claimed that its net worth in 1998 was only NT$68 billion. In a desperate act, the KMT's Lien promised in January that his party would end its involvement in business.
The KMT was weakened by a split in 1993, out of which the New Party was formed. This group is composed mainly of KMT bureaucrats who moved to Taiwan with the Chiang Kai-Shek forces in the late 1940s and their descendants.
Though the majority of Taiwan's residents over the last few centuries have migrated from mainland China, there is a clear demarcation between those who came with the KMT and earlier migrants. The former, with their descendants, have been generally labelled "mainlanders", while the earlier migrants and their descendants are "the Taiwanese".
Taiwanese account for more than three-quarters of Taiwan's population. Lee is of Taiwanese heritage. Since taking office, he has sought to promote the Taiwanese within the KMT at the expense of the mainlanders. This paved the way for the splits within the KMT in the 1990s, a process which is far from complete.
DPP threat
The DPP's chances of winning in March would have been overwhelming had it not failed to retain the mayoralty of Taipei, the capital, in 1998. The party's victory in the 1994 mayoralties contest was a major coup which shook the KMT.
Chen Shui-Bian, the DPP mayor, was widely credited for the significant improvements in Taipei's notorious traffic and other social problems. He also sought to uproot the sex industry, ruffling a few feathers among the powerful mafia.
There are divided opinions as to why Chen was defeated in 1998, but there is little dispute that he still enjoys considerable popularity and is perceived as a campaigner for clean government. Chen obtained 46% of the vote in 1998 (compared to 43% in 1994), but it was not enough to beat the KMT's Ma Ying-Jeou's 51%.
Chen's popularity is still serving him well against the other two lead candidates, Lien and Soong, who are both plagued by image problems. But the voters' choice on March 18 will hinge on a lot more than the candidates' perceived personal integrity. Voters have not forgotten Beijing's 1996 missile tests, nor have they overlooked China's more recent warnings against independence.
Elections made little difference in Taiwan before 1987 when martial law was in place (as it was for the nearly four decades previously) and political parties, other than the KMT, were banned. Chiang Ching-Kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-Shek, who ruled Taiwan with an iron fist from 1945 until his death in 1975, engineered the liberalisation. After the younger Chiang's sudden death in 1988, Lee Teng-Hui took over.
At that time, the popular movement against the KMT's repression was so strong that the legitimacy of KMT rule was called into serious question. Some democratisation of Taiwan's governing structures became unavoidable. Lee started this process in the early 1990s. In 1991, the DPP took the bold step of including in its constitution the goal of Taiwan's independence.
During the first half of the 1990s, popular elections were introduced for the decision-making structures that mattered, including the national assembly, the legislature, the mayoralties of Taiwan's two biggest cities (Taipei and Kaohsiung) and Taiwan's governorship.
The DPP has done well from these elections and poses a real threat to the KMT. It now holds about one-third of the seats in the legislature, one-quarter in the national assembly, in addition to running local governments that cover about 70% of Taiwan's population. A DPP coalition with the New Party cannot be ruled out because the combined weight of those parties may be greater than the KMT's.
Factions
Many democracy activists have sought to press for social changes by working within the DPP. Many currents emerged, representing different perspectives, class analyses and strategies. Two of them dominate: the Pan Formosa group and Pan New Current group.
The latter group advocates that the DPP should build its base among the "lower and middle classes" and, until recent years, was in favour of mass mobilisations and "self-determination" for the people of Taiwan.
The Pan Formosa group targets small and medium businesspeople and other petty bourgeois elements. It has high hopes that parliament will be a sufficient battle ground for change. A high proportion of its supporters hold public office.
One smaller current, the League for Taiwan's Independence, composed of many previously exiled activists, firmly advocates independence. Until a decade ago, it favoured armed struggle.
Other minor currents appear to be less stable, experience a higher turnover in membership and are more ready to shift alliances between the two main currents. One minor current is the Coalition for Justice, of which Chen Shui-Bian was an initiator. Chen later joined the Pan Formosa group.
The lines between these factions has blurred somewhat in recent years as the currents have undergone political metamorphoses and recomposition. The common ground remains the goal of some form of formal independent statehood.
With greater electoral success, the DPP has become increasingly dominated by the more conservative forces which are keen to preserve the status quo in class relations.
Over the last 15 years or so, a complex debate has emerged over the national question in Taiwan, the island's historical links with mainland China as well as its political options. While there is a long way to go before agreement on these issues is reached, the DPP is increasingly being pulled from within by pro-business forces which are keen to please Beijing in order to win a bigger slice of the mainland market. There is a growing pressure to bend and stretch their interpretations and positions to match this goal.
A big weakness within the Taiwanese movement is its illusions in US imperialism. At the end of the second world war, after 50 years of Japanese colonialism, control of Taiwan was handed over to the corrupt KMT. It was a decision of the US, enforced by guns.
For broader strategic considerations, Washington switched its official recognition of China from Taiwan to Beijing in 1978. However, Washington continues to hedge its bets by propping Taiwan up commercially and militarily.
The Taiwan Relations Act was passed in 1979 in an attempt to give legitimacy to US threats to militarily intervene in Taiwan. The US House of Representative's early February approval of the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act is the latest step in this direction.