By Max Lane
Attacks on government offices, police stations and shops by groups of poor people in the cities and countryside have become a feature of social and political life in Indonesia since February 1996. It is an irregular but important symptom of discontent with economic and social conditions. Increasing economic hardship combined with frustration at the government's refusal to listen to their concerns has raised the level of discontent to new heights.
The wave of spontaneous attacks on government and commercial targets has been parallelled by an increasing number of organised social and political demonstrations, including workers' strikes, especially between May and July, 1996. The most famous of these were the demonstrations at the headquarters of Megawati Sukarnoputri's Indonesia Democratic Party.
The suppression of these demonstrations provoked mass rioting in which banks, prestigious department stores and government buildings were burned. This was followed by a string of repressive measures by the government, including the arrest of prominent opposition leaders.
A further wave of protests took place before, during and after the rigged general elections last May. The biggest manifestations of anti-government protest were the mass mobilisations on the campaign days set aside for the United Development Party, the party thought by the population to be least under government control.
After the elections there was another round of militant protests over voting irregularities in a number of areas, especially East Java and Madura. Police stations and government offices were attacked and destroyed.
Department stores and government offices were again attacked in January. In most cases, the people were provoked by price rises resulting from the collapse of the rupiah and made worse by the International Monetary Fund-ordered abolition of price subsidies for basic commodities. In some towns, the price of rice, sugar and cooking oil has increased several-fold over the last few months.
In a few cases, attacks on government offices have been provoked by grievances against the local police for protecting gambling or other anti-social activities. Most of the recent outbreaks have taken place in small or medium size towns on Java, with one or two disturbances on other islands.
Chinese under attack
It is unclear how spontaneous many of the protests have been. The Indonesian media have reported that several of the incidents have been carried out by large groups of men on motor bikes who have come into the town from outside. Sometimes these groups have visited a number of towns on stretches of road up to 100 kilometres long, attacking and looting shops owned by Indonesian Chinese. The goods have been burned on the street rather taken away.
When the attacks have been carried out by the local poor, the goods have sometimes been returned a day or so later. In some towns, where conservative Muslim groups wield influence among unemployed youth and have agitated against Christian shopkeepers, the attacks have taken on a more racist tone and Chinese families have had to seek protection in police stations. In some of these areas churches, mostly used by Chinese, have been attacked.
One of the legacies of the policies of the Dutch colonial power is that many shops in Indonesian are owned by Indonesian Chinese who are therefore the first contact point for many consumers being asked to pay higher prices.
The attacks on shops and churches in provincial towns have been much smaller than the clashes between workers and the military, and street stall vendors and police, during 1996 and this year. More than 2000 people were involved in a clash between street vendors and police on January 5 in Bandung and more than 30,000 people were involved in a protest against local authorities.
The political demonstrations outside the Bank of Indonesia in Jakarta on February 9 and 10 were bigger than most of the recent riots, apart from a big riot that lasted several days in the large, isolated provincial town of Kendari on Sulawesi island.
Military inflames racism
There have been attempts to inflame anti-Chinese sentiment by top military chiefs in Suharto's apparatus. On several occasions, senior generals have criticised capital flight from Indonesia, strongly hinting that wealthy Indonesian Chinese tycoons may be behind it. They have launched a propaganda campaign accusing the tycoon Sofyan Wanandi of financing bomb attacks in Jakarta.
Wanandi is associated with retired General Benny Murdani, now based at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Murdani, once close to Suharto, has for several years been considered a rival to Suharto, especially since Suharto dropped him as a protégé.
Wanandi is the ideal scapegoat as he is located in a rival camp of militarists and tycoons. In the 1970s, Wanandi used his links with Murdani, then in command of the East Timor invasion, to develop lucrative business interests in East Timor. The Wanandi case has been in the media constantly over the last three weeks, with pictures of the tycoon frequently on the front pages of popular magazines. There have also been demonstrations by an ultra-conservative Muslim group outside the offices of the CSIS.
This campaign, rumoured to be masterminded by Suharto's son-in-law and now the head of the Strategic Army Command, General Prabowo, has failed. The country's two most popular Muslim leaders, who are also prominent critics of the regime, Amien Rais and Abdurrahman Wahid, have issued statements condemning all attacks on Chinese Indonesians. Megawati Sukarnoputri has issued a similar call. The attacks on shops that have exhibited racial characteristics have thus remained confined to the smaller cities, relatively isolated from the dynamics of national politics.
Government under fire
The military's tactic has failed to redirect anger away from the government and its policies. Demonstrations in Jakarta and other cities are aimed specifically at government policy. Following the 800-strong demonstration outside the Bank of Indonesia on February 9, another took place on February 10 at which 120 demonstrators were arrested. Many are still detained.
A few days later, a demonstration of students from the University of Indonesia took place. Their main demand was directed at the coming session of the People's Consultative Assembly.
In a last-minute move against Suharto's apparent choice as vice-president, B.J. Habibie, a wide range of senior (but mostly retired) members of the political establishment delivered a petition to the last group of uncommitted members of the Consultative Assembly urging them to nominate economic technocrat and environment minister Emil Salim. The nomination of Salim, and his endorsement by a number of established community organisations, is an attack by proxy on Suharto.
Salim has cultivated an image of being a supporter of political liberalisation and close to liberal non-government organisations. At the same time, he is a supporter of economic deregulation, as demanded by the IMF.
The Salim push, which coincides with editorials in the New York Times urging Washington to convince the Indonesian parliament not to re-elect Suharto, is another example of the regime's inability to successfully scapegoat others for the country's economic chaos.