JEAN-BAPTISTE MULEMBA MAKUBI, spokesperson of the Coalition of Democratic Organisations of the Zairean Diaspora (CODEZAD), was interviewed by ALAIN MATHIEU in the December 19 issue of the French left weekly Rouge. In France, CODEZAD represents the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Kinshasa, which is leading the armed struggle in the east of Zaire. This translation for Green Left Weekly is by Stuart Russell.
Question: How did the struggle in Kivu begin?
Fighting began due to the attacks on the people of Kivu by the ex-FAR [armed forces] of Rwanda and the refugee militias, supported by the Zairean army. The armed groups in Kivu then decided to strengthen the resistance of the population under attack.
When it was discovered in August how serious Mobutu's illness was, a crisis was unleashed within the regime. Since no "successor" was in line, there was naturally no-one who could replace him, which forced the generals to hold a crisis meeting of the army to save Mobutuism without Mobutu. The generals were shuttling between France and Zaire. But for France, Mobutu remained the key to protecting its interests.
What was envisaged was polishing the army's tarnished image by a "reconquest" of Kivu. They wanted to portray the situation as an "invasion" by a foreign aggressor, an alibi to create a patriotic awakening whereby Mobutu would appear as the saviour of national unity.
It's the same old story. For the past 30 years the government has painted all those opposed to Mobutu as nation "splitters" and troublemakers. From their perspective, it's unthinkable for the people to rise up. That idea can only come from "foreigners".
Question: What are the origins and political traditions of the groups which are currently leading the struggle in the east of Zaire?
The east of Kivu has been a bastion of the resistance to Mobutu since the 1960s. All these groups come from a political current rooted in the anticolonialist nationalism of [Patrice] Lumumba, prime minister at the time of independence and assassinated in 1961.
At that time the various Marxist perspectives were dominant. These groups lasted over 30 years, the main one being the MNC-Lumumba, which transformed into a number of offshoots. The Party of the Popular Revolution (PRP) of L. Kabila came out of this movement. Due to the gold trade in Kivu, which allowed it to buy arms, this formation functioned without outside assistance.
It is completely wrong for the media to portray Kabila as a "self-proclaimed chief" and puppet of the Rwandans. He began the armed struggle in 1960, which unleashed the guerilla struggle against the successor to Katanga, organised by Tschombé and supported by various forces including France. From 1963 until 1965, he led the Lumumbists in the eastern countryside of Zaire, who were defeated after Mobutu's seizure of power in 1965 and the counter-offensive aided by the mercenaries and imperialism.
I'm a member of the National Liberation Front of Congo-Kinshasa (FLNC), which spurred along the popular uprising in Katanga in 1977-78, and was repressed by the Moroccan and French troops. The French legionnaires came crashing down on Kolwesi in May 1978.
Other organisations claim the same tradition, but all have evolved. Some openly call for socialism, but others do not, as is often the case in Africa and in the Third World today.
The Alliance of Democratic Forces of Congo, which was formed in Kivu, is pluralist. Its goal is to overthrow the Mobutu dictatorship, in order to create a democratic state promoting social justice and development, and to break with the system of corruption and neo-colonialism.
For us the most important issue is the link between the struggle for democracy and the goals of social transformation, and a respect for democracy within the mass movement.
That's why the rebellion progresses slowly in Kivu, to allow the eventual self-organisation of the population as the territory is liberated. This practice breaks with corruption and terror, and broadens the involvement of the population in the struggle against Mobutu.
Question: How has the opposition evolved?
Groups engaged in armed struggle had to revise their perspectives after the defeats of the 1960s, at a time when the democratic struggle was intensifying in Africa and Latin America.
The FLNC made a self-criticism after the uprising of 1977. We rejected a putschist, vanguardist perspective of armed struggle, since the revolutionary nucleus, the national liberation movement, could not ignore the popular masses.
Most of the groups trained their members by work in the mass organisations, particularly the unions. All this was done in secret, since it was the time of the one-party state of Mobutu and his terror. For a decade, these members patiently explained in the unions that there could be no real social justice without a change of regime. The unions concentrated their efforts on certain demands, like salaries and working conditions.
Since the state is the main employer in Zaire, social struggles inevitably confront that state.
The mines are the main industrial activity, a large part of which are run by the Gécamines, a public authority like electricity or the water board. But the private sector is weak.
In 1967 the unions came together to form the National Union of Zairean Workers. Rather than dissolving it, Mobutu put a cap on it and made it dependent on the one-party state.
In 1985 those under Mobutu's heel pushed the union to a confrontation: either it had to defend union demands or support the one-party state. So in 1987 a general strike was unleashed which paralysed all the schools and hospitals. The repression was brutal, and thousands of teachers and health workers had to flee to neighbouring countries.
This social movement had certain political repercussions. In 1989 there were demonstrations of women traders in Kinshasa, for democracy and an end to corruption in the army. Under pressure, Mobutu was forced to consult the people by memorandums, and a kind of suggestion box. The result was the memorandums demanded his resignation.
He then orchestrated a false "democratisation" in 1990, which authorised only three parties, but which led to the creation of a plethora of unions.
From that time, Tshisekedi, the leader of the UDPS, created in 1982, played an ambiguous role. While the population demanded that Mobutu resign, he stood alone in favour of a "non-confrontational transition".
The National Conference, set up by the Mobutuists, was not sovereign, and had no power over the president or the constitution. In fact, Mobutu substituted his own views for the resolutions of the conference.
In this context, Tshisekedi agreed to be prime minister. The popular movement was at an impasse and confused, because the ostensible main opponent to Mobutu had allied himself with him. Meanwhile a part of the opposition, falsely labelled "radical", manoeuvred for ministerial portfolios rather than the end of the regime and democratic change.
Question: The student demonstrations last fall seemed to be confused, revolving around national unity, anti-Tutsi pogroms, etc.
First of all, who were the students who demonstrated? Although there are 10,000 students in Kinshasa, we always saw the same few hundred.
In fact, the university is at the mercy of the sons of the generals, who are organised in squads around the Union of Mobutuist Youth, which is close to the Group of Marshal Mobutu Supporters, which beat up the other students. Those are the ones who demonstrated.
Question: Is a general uprising of the people foreseeable?
The armed struggle in Kivu, by attacking the Zairean army and accelerating its decomposition, can be the decisive blow and transform the political conditions for democratic change. Hundreds of soldiers, including some officers, are joining the ranks of the alliance, and the movement is recruiting fighters amongst the population as it makes headway.
The struggle is broadening, even though its unlikely that well see an extension of the armed struggle to the entire country. However, popular mobilisations in the cities will grow, due to the weakening of the regime.
Our perspective is to combine the liberation of the territories in the east with a resumption of popular mobilisations, which leads to a democratic outcome and the end of the regime. In this sense, we urgently need solidarity from democratic organisations in France.