By Tom Kelly
At the Labor Party's national conference in Hobart next month, there is likely to be a strong push to further broaden the party's pro-uranium policy. Senator Bob Collins, Minister for Primary Industry and a member of the ALP right, and Gordon Bilney, Minister for Pacific Island Affairs and a member of the centre-left faction have both publicly called for the current three-mines policy to be scrapped.
Consumer Affairs minister Jeanette McHugh, a member of the ALP left, was quoted in the August 12 Australian speaking in defence of the existing policy: "In my view it would be irresponsible to allow an expansion of uranium mining ... there's enough being mined now".
According to the August 13-14 Australian Bilney said that Australia, already supplying 10% of the world's uranium market, could raise the level to 30% if the policy was changed. He pointed to Canada, with 18% of the market, supplies 40% of the market and warned that Australia was in danger of missing out. "[Canada] will get more of that lucrative trade if we don't move pretty quickly."
Labor's centre-left faction, which will hold the balance of power at the conference, is scheduled to discuss the policy at its August 26 pre-conference meeting of delegates. While there has been no formal discussion on uranium policy scheduled at the conference, the issue can be raised from the floor.
Although Labor's right faction is generally opposed to the three mine limit, it is not automatic that all its delegates will support a change of policy. In the past, significant sections of the right have blocked with the left over attempts to further weaken the policy.
In response to industry's calls to scrap the policy, Labor's left faction is soliciting Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace to help lobby conference delegates in support of the three mines position.
Three mines policy
The current three mines policy was adopted in 1984 and applies to three "named" uranium mines — Roxby Downs in South Australia, and Ranger and Nabarlek in the Northern Territory. In reality it is now a two mines policy since Nabarlek was closed in 1990.
Because of Labor's history of sell-outs on the uranium issue, and the strong reaction this has provoked among its membership, the outright abandonment of restrictions on the number of mines is unlikely to occur at this year's conference. Much more probable is a move to "reinterpret" the three mines policy.
A report in the August 8 Business Review Weekly indicates that the mining companies are preparing the ground to make reinterpretation of the policy as easy a process as possible. BRW points out that Energy Resources Australia (ERA) have changed the name of their Jabiluka deposit, 20 kilometres from the existing Ranger mine, to "North Ranger". Furthermore, BRW explains that ERA plans to truck ore from the "North Ranger" mine to the existing mill at Ranger, mill it there and dispose of the tailings there.
A further fillip for the uranium industry will come with an Access Economics report, to be published this week, which will show that Australia could double its foreign exchange earnings from uranium sales by the end of the decade if the current policy is scrapped.
It is clear that the ground has been carefully prepared to enable the Jabiluka deposit to be defined as part of the existing Ranger mine, as far as the three mines policy is concerned. This would get one new mine up with the minimum possible embarrassment to Labor.
Labor could also try to allow for a second new mine by reinterpreting the three specific mines policy to mean any three mines, thereby allowing a replacement for the mined-out Nabarlek.
The three mines policy was originally devised as a compromise; it allowed the ALP left to "oppose" uranium mining and retain some shred of credibility while the party dumped its principals. The three mines policy was sold to the anti-uranium mining constituency as "these three mines, but no more after that"; it was presented as a "phase-out" policy.
Compared to the open-slather uranium policy of the Liberal-National Coalition, the ALP's three mine position allowed it to continue to appeal to the anti-uranium mining vote while allowing uranium mining to go ahead. Still, the change in policy in 1984, was the final straw for many ALP members, who voted with their feet and left the party in droves, many joining the Nuclear Disarmament Party.
The problem for the uranium industry and the pro-uranium forces within the party is that the 1980s world glut of uranium has eased, Nabarlek has been mined out and there are signs of an upturn in demand for uranium.
Labor is being pressured by the uranium industry to drop the three mines policy in order to position itself to take full advantage of the expected increase in demand. For instance, the Indonesian government's plans for at least 11 nuclear reactors over the next decade will open up a huge market for uranium right on Australia's back door.
If Labor had lost government before there was real scope for new uranium mines, it is likely that a Coalition government would have issued permits for new mines. Labor in opposition would then have been faced with the need to accommodate new mines into its election platform.
The fact that Labor has held onto power for 11 years and is still in office at a time when there is mounting pressure to issue new uranium mine permits means that Labor's supposed "phase-out" policy is at risk of being exposed for what it always really was — a pro-uranium policy with the flexibility to allow the mining and export of uranium when the price became right.
Under the three mines policy, the ALP left, like a barking dog on a leash, has been able to pose as the defender of the interests of the anti-uranium constituency without mobilising it to force the party to adopt a real anti-uranium policy.
The mass public sentiment against uranium mining expressed publicly in the hundreds of thousands of people who mobilised annually in the Palm Sunday peace marches from the early to the mid-1980s could have been used to change the Labor Party's position. It wasn't, which necessitated the left's three mines policy subterfuge.
At ALP conferences since 1984, attempts to scrap the three mines policy have been met by sufficient public opposition to persuade pro-uranium forces within the party to postpone the battle. And the uranium market glut meant that the imperative to change the policy was not been as strong as the need to avoid electoral fallout as a result of such a change.
However the balance of forces has changed. The peace movement has subsided — a response to the end of the Cold War — and much of the green movement has adopted a strategy of lobbying the government for policy improvements. Because this fails to draw mass public attention to the issue, it means that the opportunity to mobilise and build active public support is being missed.
The net result is that the likely electoral cost of a further sell out on uranium is diminished at a time when the pressure from the industry is growing.
The ALP's success in drawing sections of the movement into the lobbying framework has further weakened the opposition to the business-propelled agenda of the ALP right, the party's dominant faction. The weakening of the movement has inevitably diminished the influence of the ALP left within the party.
For the left this is a case of its "chicken's coming home to roost"; the Labor Party machine often uses the left as its public face and to encourage illusions that the ALP will, in response to polite lobbying, deliver on progressive issues.
Possibly the strongest factor working in favour of a retention, or redefinition, of the three-mines policy is the left's need for face-saving at the national conference. With the privatisation of the Federal Airports Corporation and the Australian National Line on the agenda, the left will have an even harder time justifying their continued membership of the ALP if they cannot halt the slide on uranium.