PALESTINE: 'Intifada will continue until independence!'

May 8, 2002
Issue 

BY AHMED NIMER

RAMALLAH — One month into Israel's all-out assault on the Palestinian people of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Palestinian activists are attempting to address questions that are being more sharply posed than at any time in the 18-month intifada (popular uprising): What direction will the Palestinian struggle take? Which social forces will lead the Palestinian people's resistance to Israel's occupation?

Like all movements for national liberation, the Palestinian struggle — led by the Palestine Liberation Organisation — has encompassed competing class forces. During the recent history of the PLO, this has been expressed in the variety of competing political organisations and factions, with different political programs and strategies.

Following Israel's colonisation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, the class character of Palestinian society in these areas was decisively altered. By the mid-1980s, the massive campaign of land confiscations had weakened traditional patterns of land ownership, undermining village structures based on a large peasant class and powerful landowners. The opening of low-wage, highly exploited positions in Israel's labour force proletarianised a large layer of Palestinian young people.

This process — reinforced by the growth of universities and the growth of popular organisations — laid the basis for the first intifada that began in 1987. It shifted the centre of the struggle from the diaspora to the Palestinian territory, and in so doing challenged the dominance of the bureaucratic-military leadership of the PLO outside. This leadership was financially dependent on the Palestinian and Arab bourgeoisies, particularly those based in the Gulf regions.

The first intifada was ended by the signing of the Oslo accords in September 1993. The Oslo accords resulted in the de facto dismantling of the PLO and its replacement with the Palestinian Authority. Although the PLO continued to exist in name, the PA under the leadership of Yasser Arafat became the dominant political force.

Palestinian Authority

The PA leadership represented a fusion of the old bureaucratic-military leadership of the PLO, a new Palestinian comprador bourgeoisie which drew its profits from its privileged relationship with Israeli capital and a small layer of Palestinian commercial capitalists in the occupied territories.

At the head of the PA's structure is PA President Yasser Arafat. Arafat personally controls the PA's finances, authorises all payments to PA ministries, controls the hiring of staff and decides who will be given rights to the lucrative monopolies that dominate the Palestinian economy. In addition, Arafat also tightly controls Fatah, the largest political party within the PLO.

While the scope of the PA's political power is structurally determined by its relationship with the Israeli state and financially it is ultimately dependent upon international aid from the imperialist powers and the Arab bourgeoisie, the PA also claims to represent the national aspirations of the Palestinian people.

While the natural tendency of the capitalist PA leaders is to seek a lasting compromise with Israel, the PA need to retain the support of the Palestinian workers, youth and peasants to retain popular legitimacy. The Palestinian people's tendency is to insist that their national rights not be traded away.

The result is that the PLO-PA leadership has always attempted to balance these contradictory class interests. The uprisings of September 1996, May 1999 and May 2000 were accompanied by the PA's initial support, but were ended with the signing of deal's with Israel's government and the crushing of demonstrations by the PA security forces. In each case — for example, the Hebron protocol and the Wye River agreement — the deals did not meet the basic aspirations of the Palestinian people or push forward the struggle for national liberation.

This tension has also been reflected throughout the second intifada, which began in September 2000. Time and again, while assuring the population that the intifada will continue, the PA has conducted wide-scale arrests of political activists. When the arrests have provoked a popular outcry, the prisoners have been quietly released.

Israel responded to the second intifada with massive destruction and an unprecedented use of force. This brutal attack on the very fabric of Palestinian society has weakened the PA structures and security forces, and pushed the Palestinian population to support intensified armed guerilla struggle against the Israeli state. Fatah has split between those supporting armed struggle and those opposed.

Over the last 18 months, popular support for the PA has eroded dramatically. While Arafat's popularity remains high, PA institutions are widely considered to be corrupt and to be abstaining from the struggle. The PA is considered to be responsible for the disastrous Oslo accords.

While Israel's Prime Minister Ariel Sharon may personally prefer to eliminate Arafat and the PA, it is clear that the both the US and the European Union view Arafat as the only person capable of controlling the Palestinian masses. No doubt, discussions are occurring between the US and Israeli governments on how to create an alternative leadership, but a move to remove Arafat at this point would be a dangerous gamble for imperialism — one that would only be taken as a last resort.

The deal that resulted in Arafat being released from his headquarters in Ramallah is a striking confirmation of the role that both Israel and the US expect Arafat to play.

The deal was negotiated by Omri Sharon (Ariel Sharon's son), Mohammed Dahlan (head of the Palestinian Preventive Security force in Gaza) and Mohammed Rashid (Arafat's financial adviser and the most prominent member of the Palestinian comprador bourgeoisie). It was heavily backed by the US government.

Arafat agreed to transfer six Palestinians accused of the assassination of an Israeli cabinet minister. The deal was angrily condemned by Palestinian political factions (including sections of Fatah) who rightly view it as setting a dangerous precedent against the entire Palestinian resistance movement.

Rise of the grassroots?

Important developments are taking place that indicate that the Palestinian masses may be beginning to independently assert their interests. Large demonstrations regularly take place all over the occupied territories. The weekly Friday demonstrations in Ramallah continue to attract thousands of people.

In a significant move, the National and Islamic Forces — the umbrella group that coordinates the intifada at the grassroots level — organised a conference attended by representatives from Palestinian institutions and non-government organisations in Ramallah on May 2. Around 500 people from all walks of life in the Ramallah community took part.

Compared to a similar conference held in early 2001, there was a much broader participation by young Palestinians. It was not dominated by the established political factions. Greater prominence was given to international solidarity with speakers from the International Solidarity Movement, who had spent 34 days in Arafat's compound during Israel's siege, addressing the conference. There was also a much more combative attitude towards the PA. In particular, the transfer of the six prisoners was strongly condemned by all speakers.

The conference aimed to develop an immediate plan of action. It strongly affirmed that the intifada would continue until an independent Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital, was won.

There was much discussion on how to deepen the popular participation in the intifada. In particular, it was decided that popular neighbourhood councils should be established to organise each area of the city in preparation for another Israeli invasion. These councils would also determine the needs of the people in each area and ensure that support services and aid were directed to those most in need.

The conference, while recognising that one of Sharon's aims was to create an alternative to the PA, demanded that the PA undertake reforms and end corruption.

A national committee, separate from the PA, was proposed. This body would oversee all aid and funds that flow into the West Bank and ensure that they were properly used to develop the future Palestinian society. In particular, the conference recommended that all US government aid funds should be boycotted by Palestinian institutions.

The conference also warned the PA that political arrests would not be accepted and called for the immediate release of all political prisoners held by the PA, in particular Ahmed Sa'adat, general secretary of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Participants also decided to strengthen efforts to document the toll of the Israeli assault, particularly in Jenin, and to undertake a Palestinian public awareness campaign outside the country. The conference was a strong affirmation that the intifada will continue despite Israel's violent assault on the population.

The Ramallah conference, and similar conferences planned for all areas in the West Bank, reflect the growing realisation among Palestinian activists that for the intifada to succeed, it must deepen its popular character and establish popular control over decision-making and organisation. Key to the success of this will be the recognition that the comprador nature of the PA makes it an unreliable ally in the struggle for liberation.

Despite the defiant tone set by the conference, the real test will be whether these decisions are carried out.

From Green Left Weekly, May 8, 2002.
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