Comment by Ruben Montero
MELBOURNE — The campaign centred on the Richmond Secondary College was described by Frank Hardy before his death as one of the most inspiring working-class struggles in Australia since the 1890s strikes.
The true significance of the campaign is not based on the fact that it was "hard fought", "militant" or proved the determination of those involved. These are secondary qualities. It is important to come to grips with the crucial characteristics of the struggle. Some of them are:
- A disparate coalition of working-class parents, secondary students, unemployed teachers and community activists was able to step out from the structures that usually coopt and limit struggle. The individuals involved managed to forge a rock solid alliance that was able to lead, against all odds, such a magnificent campaign.
- An occupation is a very radical concept for the Australian community, one which brings to the fore very advanced concepts such as workers' control of industry, true community control of education and health, the nature of the state etc. Not only did Richmond occupiers take over their school but more importantly, using volunteer teachers they actually managed to run a rebel "school" for approximately 12 months.
Another important factor that characterised the campaign, one which the left has to examine closely, is that a number of individuals within the campaign were able to work with, learn from and form close links with non-socialist and in some cases conservative individuals. I believe that this non-sectarian attitude was a key factor in building the campaign and in winning respect for those individuals and their politics.
There are many other factors that set apart the Richmond campaign from numerous others, and all of these will be dealt with in print in the very near future. The nature of the campaign, as well as its strengths and weaknesses, will and must be fully debated. This is an invaluable opportunity to discuss in a non-abstract context important questions of theory and tactics facing the left in Australia. It is essential that those involved in the Richmond campaign, particularly those involved since the early days, not only pass on their experiences but remain receptive to criticism.
Ray Fulcher's article (Green Left, February 2) is a good example of how not to go about an analysis of the Richmond campaign. In the time-honoured tradition of standing on the sidelines and then trying to be wise after the event, Ray points out major errors made by the campaign and individuals. Any analysis which is based on a superficial and subjective account of the last weeks of the campaign is bound to be worthless. If Ray really wanted to come to grips with the facts, I'm sure all of the campaign executive would have made themselves available and the campaign archives would have been opened to him (as they have been to others that requested them).
It seems that after careful consideration Ray identified three major weaknesses of the campaign:
1. "The Richmond-centric nature of the campaign ...", "the campaign never seriously moved beyond the Boulevard site ...", "It imposed a self-isolation...", "No serious attempt was made to position the fight within a broader campaign for state education in Victoria". From the start of the campaign, in meetings and leaflets, the occupiers linked our struggle to the broader struggle: not just in education but the fight against cutbacks in health services, workers compensation etc. Some concrete examples include the following:
- Unemployed teachers were not only involved in the teaching at Richmond but they formed the militant VSTA branch that played an important role in mass teacher meetings. Volunteer teachers and occupiers addressed numerous school, union and workplace meetings throughout Victoria and interstate using Richmond as an example of how to fight the Kennett attacks.
- Individuals involved in the campaign played a central role in initiating and supporting the occupation of Collingwood Community Health Centre.
- The campaign produced and distributed an occupiers' handbook giving detailed instructions on how to go about an occupation. Copies were ordered from as far away as Cairns.
- In an effort to organise the broader community for the second round of school closures, the Richmond campaign organised the Education Coalition, a coalition of rank and file teachers and grassroots parent organisations.
- A minimum of $1000 a week was raised at demonstrations, rallies, workplace meetings and unions. Throughout the campaign, funds were passed on to the occupying schools. Richmond floats were prominent at all the major union and education rallies.
- Richmond sought contact with the communities of country schools threatened with closure, and a bus load of students, parents, teachers and community activists from Richmond visited these schools. The slogan of the country tour was, "It's all right to say no to school closures". None of the schools visited were subsequently closed.
2. "... undue reliance was placed on union officialdom and ... indirectly, the ALP to provide the 'muscle' for the pickets". On the night of the eviction the campaign mobilised its supporters on the phone tree and put out calls of support through 3CR and the mainstream media: the subsequent rally, after reoccupying the school temporarily, instituted pickets.
Thanks to many months of groundwork with the union movement, enough pressure was brought to bear on the VTHC executive to get an official endorsement for the picket. This was an important victory for the campaign and an indication of the extent of support. I feel no-one could describe this as "undue reliance".
Ray's claim is a little puzzling. Once the picket became a front-page issue, a few nervous ALP politicians came along to stand before the cameras. It is true that many rank and file unionists and delegates attended mass pickets, particularly after "Bloody Monday", but surely this was one of many strengths of the of the picket phase of the campaign. To claim that we relied on union officials and the ALP to supply "muscle" is a figment of Ray's imagination.
3. "Finally, there was the failure to seriously mobilise students in defence of their education."
This is an insult to the students who played an important part in the campaign, particularly the "rebel kids" who took part in the rallies, acted as media spokespeople, painted the banners, attended rallies, went on a tour of country Victoria and helped establish the short-lived Secondary Students Action.
The Richmond campaign inspired and assisted with three secondary student strikes in the second term of 1993. A large contingent of students at Richmond Girls School not only went on strike but marched to the Boulevard, where they joined students and staff at a barbecue. Secondary students also played an important role during pickets; at times both pickets were maintained mainly by kids.
Ray also takes an unprincipled swing at one of the executive of the campaign, Stephen Jolly, lumping him in with others who believed that the campaign would not succeed without reimposing the pickets. Jolly's position is reduced to about three sentences and then dismissed as simplistic.
The whole question of reimposition of the pickets was a very contentious one in the final week. Every member of the executive was in agreement that we would not achieve our aims without reinstituting the pickets: the only disagreement was on timing.
If we are to learn anything from the Richmond struggle, let's seek truth from the facts.
[Ruben Montero was a "rebel teacher" at Richmond Secondary College, a member of the campaign executive and one of the "Richmond 8".]