Selecting a president
Despite the Howard government's attempt to rig the constitutional convention by appointing half of its membership, the large vote for republican candidates in last year's postal vote has given a strong momentum to the push for a republic. Even John Howard now appears at least partially reconciled to the ending of the monarchical anachronism.
The focus of attention has thus shifted to the method of selecting the president of an Australian republic. There are so far three proposals: popular election, election by parliament and appointment by some sort of council of "eminent" public figures.
If the new president were to be purely a figurehead, the method of selection would hardly matter. It could safely be left to a national lottery among all residents with a liking for pomposity, bludging and wearing funny clothes.
However, it seems far more likely that the president will be granted the "reserve powers" which are now given to the governor-general. These include the power to command the armed forces, to dismiss a government and to dissolve parliament. As November 1975 demonstrated, these powers are real even if not directly exercised very frequently.
The reserve powers have a clear reason for existence. It is to protect the ruling class from democracy, in the unlikely event that an elected government should go beyond the "proper bounds" by threatening capitalist wealth or power.
It would thus be a democratic reform to abolish the reserve powers entirely, but it is certain that the constitutional convention will not even dream of discussing such an idea.
In these circumstances, popular election of the president is clearly the best alternative. This, of course, will not "democratise" the reserve powers, which are inherently anti-democratic. But popular election is the least undemocratic way of selecting the person who exercises the reserve powers, and holds out the possibility of popular opinion having at least some minor influence on how the powers are used.