By Max Lane
The rubber stamp People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) appointment in March of Suharto as president for another five years was the trigger that escalated a wave of student demonstrations which spread right around Indonesia.
These demonstrations were characterised by increasing militancy, thousands of students confronting Suharto's repressive military in attempts to conduct "long marches" off campus. The cry of "Lower prices", "Out with Suharto and his family" and "Reform or death" spread everywhere.
The anger towards the regime has been deepened and extended by the economic crisis. The most devastating impact has been the massive increase in prices.
A major factor in the explosion in Jakarta on May 13-14 was the increase in fuel prices, which the IMF insisted be carried out. In the wake of the riots, the government announced it would rescind the increase in fuel prices.
Dictator isolated
Suharto's isolation has been increasing since the strike wave of 1995-6, culminating in July 1996, when People's Democratic Party (PRD) labour leader Dita Sari was arrested. The rise in popularity of Megawati Sukarnoputri and unrest among the urban poor led to a crackdown against the PRD and the arrest of Budiman Sujatmiko and other PRD leaders.
This repression did not prevent the million-strong anti-regime mobilisations during the May 1997 elections, nor the wave of attacks on government buildings and police stations immediately after the elections.
The wave of student demonstrations beginning in February 1998, encompassing almost every major city and involving campuses previously devoid of political activity, added another sector mobilising against the regime.
Since the banning of Tempo, Detik and other magazines in 1994, key moderate figures in the intelligentsia have joined the opposition.
The opposition from the moderate intelligentsia was joined after the May 1997 elections by Amien Rais. Rais heads a 28-million strong Muslim educational and humanitarian association, but so far has not attempted to mobilise his membership.
Workers, the urban poor, intellectuals and students have all now experienced waves of mobilisation against Suharto. With each wave, many people gain political experience and confidence, especially when the regime's repressive apparatus proves ineffective.
Despite the banning of many newspapers, critical views and anti-government information are more widespread than ever. Word of mouth, the internet, the work of the PRD underground and new levels of coordination among campuses have limited the effectiveness of the press bans.
Workers continue to strike, despite the "distraction" of other events. On May 12 and 13, hundreds of public transport drivers in Bogor went on strike, as did hundreds of electronic assembly line workers in Bekasih. A thousand struck in a cardboard factory in Tangerang.
The rioting on May 13-14, although without a clear political focus, showed that the anger and preparedness to fight the military remain strong among the urban poor. And there are no signs that the student movement is preparing to retreat.
The People's Council initiated by Amien Rais may try to link up with Megawati and her Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). Whether this council will act merely as a vehicle for pressure on the regime and the military, or will become a fully fledged vehicle for the mobilisation of broader social forces, is not yet clear.
Coup or democratic revolution?
The international expectation is that Suharto is likely to go. But how he goes will be important in determining what comes after.
The only constitutional means is through the calling of an extraordinary session of the MPR — the same body that unanimously appointed Suharto president in March and which was largely hand-picked by Suharto himself.
For the leaders of the MPR to call a special session in defiance of Suharto would require a majority of Indonesia's crony, top bureaucrat and military figures both to reach a consensus to dump Suharto and to reach a consensus as to who would replace him.
In particular, it would require most of the armed forces leadership to agree, including Suharto's son-in-law, General Prabowo, at least while he continues to command the Army Strategic Reserve.
While such a scenario is not impossible, there are no signs that such a consensus has been reached. The prevailing strategy still seems to be to promise undefined political reform and crisis-manage the economy, hoping that the political crisis passes.
The armed forces chief, General Wiranto, in his public statements stresses that change must be developed upon "what has already been built". The armed forces are not yet willing to contemplate a break with the New Order.
The United States, while keeping up diplomatic pressure on Suharto, has confined its urgings to an undefined "political reform", which it claims that both Suharto and other regime officials have accepted as necessary. The US is sticking to its proposal of an "orderly transition".
In this situation, it is unlikely that Suharto will be removed by the Indonesian ruling class, of which his own family and cronies are a key part, unless the country reaches a stage of virtual ungovernability.
In the immediate future, the most feasible cause of such a development would be a drastic shortage of consumer goods precipitated by a combination of price rises and panic hoarding by the wealthy. Preventing this scenario will be the top priority of the regime.
The alternative to either a constitutional or real coup is a popular uprising that forces a complete retreat by both Suharto and the army. In the face of a refusal to retreat by either of these forces, the uprising would have to transform itself into a mass insurrection, subverting the confidence of the ordinary soldier and arming to defend itself against attack by the military.
Many of the ingredients for a popular uprising exist. These include widespread mass anger and combativeness and the isolation of the regime; increasing national coordination among the social vanguard, the students; and a growing core of organisers being recruited and trained by the PRD underground — although often not identifiable as PRD.
There is also an increasingly outspoken range of middle class opposition figures. Their access to the media, outspokenness in calling for Suharto to go and apparent higher levels of unity steadily increase their political authority among the masses.
This authority has yet to be used to mobilise the masses. At most, individual public figures have called on the students to continue their demonstrations. They seem to be hoping that the threat of more disorder will frighten the military into a deal with them.
However, such a deal would mean the army accepting complete withdrawal from politics, a demand supported by all of the democratic forces. General Wiranto's wife and daughter would have to give up their parliamentary seats. Alternatively, of course, the moderate opposition could betray its opposition to a political role for the army.
More student demonstrations are being planned. There is no doubt that Amien Rais and the People's Council and Megawati's PDI will, at the very least, give moral support to continuing student demonstrations. Popular anger will continue to deepen, even if the regime is able to stave off another explosion for the time being. The contradiction between the people and the dictatorship will grow sharper.
In this process, the potential grows for a more radical resolution. The longer a mass confrontation with the dictatorship is postponed, the clearer it will become that the economic suffering of the people is as much caused by Indonesian society's subordination to the needs of the IMF and international capital as it is by the greed of Suharto and his cronies.
With each crisis, the IMF will call for even harsher methods or withhold loans, making fuel and food subsidies harder. The moderate opposition will be confronted with their own support for capitalism and their acceptance, however unadvertised within Indonesia, of the need to work with the IMF.
In this situation, the ability of the radical movement, still essentially represented by the PRD, to win a bigger hearing among the masses will be crucial. The PRD alone calls for nationalisation of vital industry and the banks, which would be necessary for any people's government to successfully confront the IMF.
The PRD remains the most consistent advocate of mass power in the process of change. It alone advocates the organised working class as the only force capable of winning political democracy and implementing economic democracy as well.
To date, the PRD's tactics have been remarkably well attuned. Many of its demands and slogans have been adopted widely.
For those who believe that only organised working people's power can secure real freedom, now is time to increase support for the radical movement in Indonesia while mobilising the maximum possible public opinion against the dictatorship.