By Max Lane
Supporters and observers of the independence struggle in East Timor have for some time been watching for signs of differences between the Indonesian regime's two main factions: the Suharto clique and the armed forces (ABRI) leadership. Many observers tend to think that Suharto has been moving towards attempting some kind of political solution.
This view has been fed by the numerous twists and turns in the regime's diplomatic efforts to counteract the influence of the pro-Timorese lobby in many parts of the world. Every decision to meet with a UN or Portuguese delegation has been read as an indication that Suharto is "softening" his approach.
At the same time, the refusal of Indonesian military authorities to allow International Red Cross personnel to visit Xanana Gusmao unhindered, despite assurances from Jakarta that it would be possible, has been taken as a sign that ABRI holds a more hardline position.
The recent meeting between Suharto and US President Clinton in Tokyo logically would have provided an opportunity for Suharto to indicate some softening of the regime's approach. Clinton had just received a letter from 43 US senators calling for greater support for UN efforts to resolve the conflict in East Timor.
Even Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas, in Tokyo with Suharto, expected the issue to be raised. According to Alatas, Indonesia "would not think it strange" if Clinton raised the issue of human rights with Suharto. "All countries have their shortcomings", he said.
Despite Alatas' comments, on his return flight to Indonesia, Suharto made it clear to journalists that there was no change in the regime's position. Suharto told the journalists that he had informed Clinton that Indonesia had only reluctantly taken over East Timor because that was what the East Timorese wanted. There was no indication of any change in this. The Indonesian media also reported that Suharto defended the action taken against East Timorese demonstrators
in Dili in November 1991.
The only real difference between Suharto and ABRI on East Timor is due to the fact that Suharto is in government and ABRI is not. Suharto has to deal diplomatically with the rising level of support, including in US, Japanese and European parliaments, for some kind of resolution to the conflict.
This pressure on Indonesia is likely to continue as a result of the continuing campaigns by the East Timorese and their supporters and as a result of rivalries between Japan, the US and Europe over influence in Indonesia and access to the oil in the Timor Gap.
Portugal has succeeded in pushing Europe in a very strong anti-Indonesia direction, while Japan provides considerable aid to Indonesia. The US, closely aligned with elements in the Indonesian state apparatus now out of government, including ABRI, does not mind seeing some pressure on Suharto.
While Suharto must deal with the diplomatic problems, ABRI can afford to thumb its nose at international opinion. ABRI itself has suffered only minor setbacks, such as loss of small amounts of military training aid from the US. This year, with Pentagon approval, it is making an attempt to buy the training. It is increasing its weapons acquisitions from Britain and its training exercises with Australia.
There are no real signs, however, of any change by either faction towards allowing self-determination by the Timorese. Such change is not out of the question but is most likely to come with the strengthening of the pro-democracy movement in Indonesia.