Following bilateral discussions between the African National Congress and the National Party government in February, a multiparty preparatory conference was held on the weekend of March 6-7. The 26 political organisations present agreed to open formal negotiations on April 5, some nine months after the last round of talks stalled; only the white supremacist, pro-apartheid, Conservative Party abstained on the vote. The negotiation process, and permissible concessions along the road to a democratic South Africa, are the subject of intense, and increasingly bitter, debate within the liberation movement. Green Left Weekly's FRANK NOAKES, recently in Johannesburg, canvassed the opinions there.
"Surely a fool may suspect correctly that ... sacrifices were not paid in order to reach some so-called power-sharing arrangements between the elite of the oppressed and the oppressors", Winnie Mandela comments.
While not being opposed to negotiations, she complains that the masses are not being "taken along". These views are shared by many within the Tripartite Alliance of the ANC, South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), as well as by those from different political traditions. Some express the question in the extreme form: "Why is the ANC getting into bed with the oppressor?"
The backdrop to these discussions on the way forward to a just and democratic society is a pervasive climate of fear, as a tidal wave of violence washes over South Africa. The political stand-off between the government and the liberation forces has left the country paralysed; the disappearing jobs of black workers are counted in their hundreds of thousands, social solidarity is breaking down at an alarming rate, and the redistribution of wealth takes place on street corners at the point of a gun.
Everybody recognises that this situation must be resolved. Most people are investing their hope in the proposed democratic election, expected within 12 months. The ANC and the National Party of President F.W. de Klerk say all now turns on the outcome of the next round of discussions in the CODESA (Convention for a Democratic South Africa) process, and the pressure is on to find a compromise.
ANC
"It has always been the ANC's ardent conviction that a peaceful settlement could help facilitate the demise of the
apartheid system and the birth of a united, non-racial and non-sexist democratic society", the ANC's deputy secretary general, Jacob Zuma, explained to delegates at a recent international solidarity conference in Johannesburg.
"When the ANC and other organisations of our people were unbanned in February 1990, the leadership took a decision to begin to engage the powers that be in talks. To help this process along, the ANC leadership took a decision to unilaterally suspend all armed action and related activities with effect from August 1990."
Zuma asserts that "this created conditions where bilateral and multilateral discussions between the ANC and other political forces became possible". In the end, the ANC and 18 other participants initiated the CODESA negotiations.
CODESA was a landmark on the road to freedom, Zuma says. "Many political players coming from different backgrounds came together with a single aim of negotiating the establishment of a new South Africa. However, the CODESA process broke down after the second plenary. For some months thereafter, the country was thrown into a state of utter confusion and uncertainty. The economy took a nose dive, business and investor confidence further waned, and hopes that politically motivated violence would soon come to an end were dashed."
After a series of bilateral discussions between the National Party and the ANC, and a summit between Nelson Mandela and President de Klerk, negotiations were put back on the agenda. A Record of Understanding was signed committing the ANC and the National Party, among other things, to an interim government of national unity.
"Although the Record of Understanding evoked negative responses from some political quarters, it is now broadly agreed amongst all political players that a resumption of multilateral negotiations is extremely urgent.
"If you have massive political support and muscle, there is a belief you can change the world all by yourself. The reality, especially in this country, is that there are other people presenting different powers which they can use to sabotage the direction of a new government. We therefore believe our approach should be all-inclusive", argues Zuma on behalf of the ANC national executive committee. "We want a lasting solution supported by all", he says.
Nelson Mandela explains it more pointedly: "We would like to forestall the possibility of a counter-revolutionary onslaught on the democratic government which will be established".
Measures such as the restructuring the armed forces to reflect in their composition the broader community, rather than disbanding of them, should help to allay the fears of some sections among whites, and perhaps break their resistance to the transition to democracy, he states.
The ANC envisages a resumed CODESA agreeing to hold democratic elections for a constituent assembly within the next 12 months. In the meantime a multiparty Transitional Executive Council, charged with ensuring that the elections are free and fair and assuming joint control over the armed forces, will be established.
The most controversial aspect of the package, endorsed unanimously by the ANC NEC, is the proposal for an all-inclusive form of government to run the country for the next five years, gradually implementing a new, and yet to be agreed upon, constitution.
The NEC, after much debate, ended with a statement saying: 'In the interest of peace, stability and reconstruction, there will be a need for a government of national unity of limited duration, that draws on the talents of a representative range of South Africans".
The interim government will be a coalition of all parties with at least 5% of the seats in the single chamber constituent assembly; these parties will be represented proportionally in the cabinet. Some members of the NEC reportedly argued for a coalition with the National Party for only nine months, that is, until the new constitution is drawn up.
The new president will exercise executive powers after consultation with cabinet. On some issues, the president will need to win a two-thirds majority in cabinet to gain assent for legislation. This is where it could be possible for an alliance of conservative forces, if it included the right-wing Inkatha Freedom Party of Chief Buthelezi, to thwart the ANC and its allies.
PAC
But the Pan Africanist Congress thinks the ANC leadership is on the wrong track altogether.
"We are not dealing with parties which differ with their programs and policies; we're dealing with oppressor and oppressed. And for that reason the meeting to discuss the political issues cannot be a round table affair, but a two-sided table affair", says PAC general secretary Benny Alexander.
This is not just political differences between parties, as in an ordinary democracy, he insists, and the oppressed should be united in meeting with the oppressor to talk about the destruction of oppression.
The PAC believes that the international community should be involved in the negotiations, to underwrite, administer and verify them. After all, he says, the Pretoria regime is illegitimate in the eyes of the world. As with the Arab-Israeli discussions, a neutral venue with a neutral convener should be used.
While the PAC is small compared with the ANC, and operates in the margins of left politics in the townships, it does express some of the doubts and fears of activists there. It rejects totally the CODESA process, "not because people couldn't agree, but because it is structurally deficient".
Because CODESA was round table, it allowed the National Party to play up differences among the forces for liberation, and the agenda did not lead towards the objective of the exercise but rather begged questions. Hundreds of irrelevant items were discussed but not the fundamental one of state power, Alexander complains.
"We differ with the ANC on the relationship between struggles and negotiations. The ANC holds the view that you must end the struggle in order to talk, and the PAC says you must talk in order to end the war."
The PAC finds no contradiction in simultaneously talking with the government and conducting an armed struggle against it; the regime, the PAC points out, has a R5 billion ($2.5 billion) program to destabilise black communities and has hired mercenaries to kill and terrorise.
"The PAC does not have the capacity to stop the interim government, but the PAC does have the capacity to discredit it. We are not going to take part in this government.
"The interim government is an attempt to coopt the oppressed and prolong the life of the racist parliament and the National Party." For Alexander, this is the liberation movement coming to terms with apartheid, instead of "destroying it".
The economy is in deep crisis, and South African capitalism, which has never been able to provide for all the people, now increasingly cannot sustain all sections of the white community. All signs point to the crisis worsening at a time when unemployment is already around 48% and inflation 20%. Alexander says that a strong administration is needed after the elections,
but the interim government will be "based on minority veto".
"The regime wants us to join this interim government of theirs and work with them for a period of five years, so we too can fail and we too can have the wrath of the people. We must also become ministers of labour and be unable to give jobs and come on national TV and appeal to workers to understand and have the workers rise up against us. We too must become ministers of education and fail, because things are going to get worse. That's a trap, a five year trap."
Alexander argues for a clean break, no transitions from apartheid to democracy.
There is no sure and easy road ahead for the democratic forces in South Africa, and the political violence is making the situation desperate. Much of the argument is based on the assessment of where the balance of forces lies between the government and the organisations of the oppressed, and how it might be favourably altered.
"The balance of forces can be changed. In fact there is nothing that we've achieved so far that can be ascribed to compromise. Every single setback that the liberation movement is suffering at the moment can be attributed to compromise. Every single gain we have made — unbanning, the release of political prisoners and the return of the exiles — can be attributed solely and purely to the struggle, in solidarity with the international community", says Alexander.
AZAPO
Like the PAC, the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) takes a hard line. The unbanning of the peoples' organisations was the product not of some change of heart by de Klerk, but a result of struggle. The people had "set into motion a process that the government could not repel", says deputy secretary general Lybon Mabasa.
The government "then, like any other government in the world, went through a process of reform in order to elongate their time in office and to contain the revolutionary forces.
"The present negotiations, as we see them, are not trying to empower the oppressed and exploited, but actually to reinforce the power of the regime and the elite within our community. We are saying that there should be no secret deals, there should be no negotiations behind the backs of our people, no negotiations where the government is both player and referee", Mabasa states. Negotiations should be about the transfer of economic and
political power only, according to AZAPO.
There is a great deal of confusion in the black communities, and elsewhere, about what ANC and government are really proposing. ANC branches have been flooded with material, but it is written in legalistic terms and has led to frustration and even anger from rank and file members. In the broader community the charge of "sell-out" can increasingly be heard.
Mabasa takes this up: "Those that have been seen to be fighting for the liberation of the people have deviated from playing the role of catalysts and facilitators of the process of change for the majority. They have transferred the responsibilities of the people to themselves. We seem to have a situation where the ANC is expected to fight for the ANC, the PAC to fight for the PAC, and even AZAPO is expected to fight for AZAPO. These organisations should simply be the vehicles which carry out the aspirations of the people.
"Our people don't want things to be done on their behalf without their involvement. The political leaderships take decisions without even going back to the people who mandated them to act on their behalf to ask 'are we still on course?'." AZAPO, Mabasa claims, hears the people saying that the political leadership is not on course.
"AZAPO holds the view that the regime is not going to willingly hand over power; that the process of the transfer of political power is always dependent on the capacity of those who are struggling against those who hold power. With that in mind, AZAPO still maintains that the struggle needs to be carried out even more vigorously than IT has been carried out before", he says.
SACP
However, what the PAC/AZAPO position appears to ignore is the role that mass struggle can play during the period of the government of national unity, a point taken up by a South African Communist Party leader, Jeremy Cronin. Cronin contends that with the advent of the interim government, mass struggle, far from being redundant, will be "essential".
ANC regional chairperson Tokyo Sexwale makes the point that these first democratic elections are not "just ordinary elections, but a crucial moment in the revolutionary struggle".
The Central Committee of the SACP has expressed general support for the transition package adopted by the ANC NEC. The SACP has played an influential role in the debate around the question of negotiations and what concessions are permissible. In its adopted
resolution, the SACP points out:
"While the proposed interim government of national unity and subsequent government of national unity and reconstruction will still fall short of a full majority rule dispensation, they begin to introduce elements of majority rule into government. In the circumstances of the present situation, the package is a compromise which can open the way to a process of full transfer of power to the people."
It is essential to be honest with the people about the package, though, the SACP cautions. It should not be underrated nor should it conceal the real limitations and dangers, they stress.
Spokespeople for the ANC have tended to obscure the nature of the agreement. Nelson Mandela has said, "An interim government of national unity is not power-sharing". But some see this as playing with words; the government's Fanus Schoeman says, "A government of national unity is power-sharing. There is nothing voluntary about it, except in the sense that a party may refuse to participate if it so chooses."
An SACP resolution on the way forward in negotiations places "great emphasis on the need for major reconstruction of the state and society, even in the transition period. The transitional period will be meaningless if millions of workers and the poor do not begin to experience real changes in their lives."
There will be a need for ongoing mass organisation, mobilisation and vigilance through the entire period of transition, and the people need to be made aware of the problems that could arise. Chris Hani, SACP general secretary, recently told a rally of party supporters that, in reference to Zimbabwe and Namibia, "negotiations were only a moment in the whole terrain of struggle".
Similarly, non-SACP leaders of the ANC, including the influential Pallo Jordan, stress the need for mass struggle. This position has clear support among rank and file ANC members.
That the ANC, campaigning on the slogan "Now is the Time", will win overwhelming endorsement from the electorate is beyond dispute. And the ANC's stated route to peace and democracy is probably the position that most closely reflects what's possible in the present situation.
Just what room it will have to manoeuvre in government, at what pace change will occur and what role the people will be permitted to play are the crucial, and as yet unanswerable, questions facing the liberation movement and its
constituency.