Guerilla Days in Ireland
By Tom Barry
Dublin: Anvill Books. 1981
Reviewed by Rupen Savoulian
This is not a new book, but it's worthwhile having a look for it at your local library or bookshop.
Tom Barry was born in 1898 in County Cork. In June 1915, like many of his generation, he signed up with the British army to see what war was like; in his words, "I had no national consciousness".
The book begins with what Barry calls a "rude awakening", when in May 1916, he was serving with the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force. Passing by a display of war communiqués, he read about a rebellion in Dublin.
The Easter Uprising began a process of reappraisal in Barry's mind. The victory of the Republicans in the elections of 1918 and the proclamation of Dail Eireann, establishing the de facto government of Ireland in January 1919, further enhanced and solidified Barry's national consciousness. In 1919, Barry approached members of the Volunteers (the IRA guerillas) in his native West Cork to offer his services.
Barry describes the influence of the British ascendancy in Bandon, a town in West Cork, beginning with the "Big House", the main residence of the Earl of Bandon. From this residence extended the local network of Irish collaborators, those farmers who received the crumbs from the Earl of Bandon's table. A smaller number of big farmers and merchants, says Barry, aspired to join the British loyalist network. However, it was no secret that the British authority rested primarily on coercion.
In Bandon alone, British police and military forces numbered 3000. One of the largest garrisons in West Cork was located in Bandon, and the Black and Tans (a terrorist force made up mainly of British ex-servicemen) commandeered a hotel in Bandon as well. The forces of the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) were omnipresent also. All these forces had battle experience, were well trained in the most modern weaponry and were habituated to bloodshed.
Barry was attached to the Third (West) Cork Brigade as a training officer in 1920, mainly because of his experience. The West Cork Volunteers had no military experience or training, were unfamiliar with modern armaments and had no tactical training. They had little ammunition, no barracks and no media with which to publicise and explain their objectives. They faced an enemy with superior numbers and firepower.
The Volunteers decided to form a flying column. This formation was a guerilla unit, living off the land and relying on the sympathies of the local population, choosing the time and location of its attacks and avoiding suicidal losses. The flying column continually harassed the enemy forces and undermined the attempts to rebuild its battered civil administration. Barry became the commander of the West Cork flying column in 1920.
The Flying Column proved that the Irish population was far from subdued, and had the skill and military expertise to inflict substantial losses on British forces. The "invincible" Black and Tans, RIC units and British troops, hitherto terrorising and intimidating the population with impunity, now faced a disciplined and dedicated rebel force.
One of the main targets for IRA attacks was the network of spies and informers that the British ascendancy had carefully built up over the years of occupation. Barry says, "These were the bloodhounds who nosed out the victims for the British murder gangs". Wiping out this network of spies demoralised the RIC and removed a serious threat to the existence of the flying column.
The British press portrayed the Volunteers as a gang of ruthless and vicious killers. But as Barry explains, the IRA treated honourably those units of the British army that did not murder or maltreat Irish prisoners. For example, members of the King's Liverpool Regiment, which behaved reasonably towards Irish Volunteer prisoners, were left unmolested when unarmed or off duty, but no such mercy was shown to members of the Essex, which was ruthless towards Irish prisoners and murdered and tortured.
The West Cork Volunteers had to contend with a particularly vicious instrument of terrorism — what Barry calls the "fire terror".
From 1920, arson gangs accompanied the British forces on their raids into rebellious Irish territory. The arson gangs would burn down the houses of farmers, workers and labourers who had sheltered Irish Volunteers. All those suspected of sympathies with the IRA were the targets of arson attacks.
It was intended that arson would deprive the Volunteers of active support from the local population. The British military commander in West Cork received a message from the West Cork flying column that for every Republican home burned, two British Loyalists' homes would be burned in retaliation.
The British continued to burn the houses of IRA sympathisers. The West Cork Volunteers retaliated by burning loyalist residences. As Barry explains, this strategy was costly and the Irish people suffered. However, "If the Republicans of West Cork were to be homeless and without shelter, then so too, would be the British supporters".
As the West Cork Volunteers intended, howls of protest were heard from the loyalists; while farmers and labourers would lose houses worth only a few hundred pounds, the giant, stately residences of the British ascendancy, costing thousands of pounds, were being razed. The British policy of arson was never officially stopped, but it was muted after the IRA's counter-measures took effect.
The British, previously operating in the countryside with arrogant impunity, were now forced to shelter in their barracks. Performing only large-scale raiding operations, they would comb a particular area and quickly retire to their fortresses.
The British were isolated within the ocean of a hostile population. Farmers and workers would inform the West Cork Volunteers of enemy troop movements, railway workers monitored dispatches, doctors treated wounded and sick Volunteers, the flying column, marching across the countryside, would be housed and fed by poor farm labourers, the shopkeepers sheltered IRA Volunteers as the British searched for them.
Barry berates those IRA commanders that were lax in taking the fight to the enemy. Many areas of Ireland were passive, and bad leadership certainly played its role. Barry admits that "some Battalions never caused a single casualty to the British during the whole Anglo-Irish conflict".
Barry could perhaps have elaborated more on the cliques that took shape within the Irish revolutionary movement, something he calls "the great curse of every National and Revolutionary movement". He does not explain the political problems these cliques created within the revolutionary movement.
This book is not a history of the Anglo-Irish conflict during 1916-22, but an account of Tom Barry's role in that conflict. There is no bitterness in this account, given the divisions and internecine strife caused by the Civil War subsequent to the 1922 truce. It is the story of a relatively apolitical soldier who evolves into a professional guerilla and revolutionary. It is an inspiration for all activists seeking to bring about meaningful social and political change.