By Norm Dixon
President Bill Clinton on December 16 launched the United States' latest bombardment of the Iraqi people. Disregarding overwhelming worldwide opposition, Washington and London launched a massive four-night air attack that killed at least 62 Iraqi soldiers and more than 80 civilians.
Knowing that the brazen assault would be vetoed by the United Nations Security Council if it were given the opportunity, Clinton and British Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair gave the final thumbs-up for the attack even as the council was in session.
The council was discussing UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq head Richard Butler's report on Iraq's cooperation with UNSCOM weapons inspectors. Clinton and Blair used the flimsy evidence and exaggerated claims in Butler's report as justification for the bloodbath.
If there ever was any doubt that Butler is an agent of the US, the events surrounding the latest outrage against Iraq put them to rest.
Former senior UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter told the December 17 New York Post that US officials prodded inspection teams to provoke a crisis to justify bombing. "What Richard Butler did last week with the inspections was a set-up", Ritter said.
Ritter is hardly a friend of Iraq. He was a US military intelligence officer based in Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Gulf War and was at the centre of a crisis in January 1998, when Iraq accused Ritter of being a US spy. Ritter resigned from UNSCOM because he claimed it and the US were "too soft" on Saddam Hussein.
US influence
Butler was supposed to deliver his report to the Security Council on December 14, at the same time as the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA report found that Iraq "provided the necessary level of cooperation" to allow nuclear inspections to be carried out "efficiently and effectively".
At the request of the US, Butler delayed the formal presentation of his report until the evening of December 15.
"With Clinton in Israel through the weekend and the Muslim holy month of Ramadan beginning on Saturday, the window for American and British military action was very narrow, officials said", reported the New York Times on December 18. "The administration did not want to offend Arab allies, or put the president's safety in jeopardy, by ordering an attack while Clinton was still in Israel, a senior American official said."
The Washington Post on December 18, quoting a "high-ranking [US] administration official", reported that Butler communicated his conclusions to the US on December 13, two days before they were made known to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the Security Council, which supposedly employs him.
"According to accounts from several participants ... Butler had briefed American officials as early as last Friday [December 11] on his most recent conclusions", the New York Times reported on the same day.
On December 16, the Washington Post reported: "Butler's conclusions were welcomed in Washington, which helped orchestrate the terms of the Australian diplomat's report. Sources in New York and Washington said Clinton administration officials played a direct role in shaping Butler's text during multiple conversations with him [on December 14] at secure facilities in the US mission to the United Nations."
On December 18, the paper added, "Administration officials acknowledge they had advance knowledge of the language he would use and sought to influence it, as one official said, 'at the margins'".
Butler withdrew UNSCOM inspectors from Iraq on December 14 on the advice of the US and without the authorisation of the Security Council. According to the December 18 New York Times, "the president issued a highly classified order to the Pentagon on Sunday morning [December 13] that began a 72-hour countdown to the air assault".
Dishonesty
An examination of Butler's report reveals its dishonesty. Since November 17, when Iraq allowed UNSCOM inspections to resume after briefly halting cooperation, there had been at least 427 inspections. The report identified problems with five.
In one case, inspectors were made to wait 45 minutes before they were given access to a guest house that had previously been an office of a security organisation. In a second incident, UNSCOM inspectors were not allowed to interview undergraduate students at Baghdad University's science department about their research.
In the most widely cited incident, inspectors were refused admittance to the Baghdad headquarters of the ruling Baath Party. Thirty inspectors, headed by Australian Roger Hill, arrived without warning and demanded entry — too many under the terms of an agreement between UNSCOM and the Iraqi government. Four inspectors were eventually admitted.
Butler wrote in his report that UNSCOM had "solid evidence" of "proscribed materials" hidden there, including "ballistic missile components". The London Times on December 17 revealed that this "solid" evidence was only the say-so of CIA-backed Iraqi "dissidents" seeking to overthrow the Baath Party.
UNSCOM inspectors also demanded the right to inspect two establishments on Fridays — the Muslim holy day — and insisted that no Iraqis accompany them. This breached an agreement that government officials accompany inspectors on Fridays if nobody is working at the site.
Despite writing, "In statistical terms, the majority of the inspections of facilities and sites under the ongoing monitoring system were carried out with Iraq's cooperation", Butler concluded, "the Commission is not able to conduct the substantive disarmament work mandated to it by the Security Council".
Russia and China called for Butler's dismissal. China's UN representative said, "The leader of UNSCOM has played a dishonourable role in the crisis. The reports submitted by UNSCOM to the secretary general were unfounded and evasive of the facts."
Spying
Whatever remaining credibility Butler had was shattered on January 8, when UN officials, angry at Washington's manipulation of UNSCOM, leaked details of how the US and other countries spied on Iraq using UNSCOM as cover.
The Washington Post revealed that from 1996, UNSCOM provided information to the US that could pinpoint the whereabouts of Saddam Hussein and reveal his security precautions.
Until 1998, this was done using Israeli-supplied hand-held devices capable of monitoring and recording radio communications. The recordings were analysed in Israel, Britain and the US.
In 1998, the "US took control of the operation", the Post reported, and installed a sophisticated "black box" able to automatically send intercepted messages via a "satellite relay in a nearby country to the National Security Agency at Fort Meade [Maryland, USA]".
The January 8 London Times reported, "US officials said that some of the intelligence was used in last month's four-day bombing campaign".
While Butler immediately denied that UNSCOM passed information to the US, the Washington Post reported that US officials confirmed the leaked details.
Butler approved the installation of the "black box", the newspaper reported. After the US took charge of the operation, "Washington specified that only Butler and his deputy, Charles Duelfer, be given access to the intercepted material".
Ritter, whom the Washington Post identified as the UNSCOM official who initiated the operation in 1996 with the approval of former UNSCOM head Rolf Ekeus, told the French newspaper Libération on January 8 that UNSCOM had a "special relationship" involving the sharing of intelligence with the spy agencies of five countries, including the US and Israel.
Ritter told the January 10 Chicago Tribune that Butler gave him the order to install the black box last July, and that Washington had complete control of the device.
Labor man
Butler has always been a loyal servant to his political masters. He rose through the Australian diplomatic corps under the patronage of the ALP.
A former private secretary to several federal Labor opposition leaders, he was appointed Australia's representative on disarmament to the UN when the Hawke Labor government was elected in 1983. His role was to try to confuse and coopt the mass anti-nuclear weapons movement developing in Australia.
In the late 1980s, as ambassador to Thailand, Butler campaigned for Labor foreign minister Gareth Evans' "peace plan" for Cambodia, which championed a formula to allow the genocidal Khmer Rouge to participate in a coalition government and down-played the atrocities of Pol Pot.
Later, Butler was appointed Australia's ambassador to the UN.
A Times of India editorial last November gave this account of Butler's progress after arriving in New York: "After the Liberals won the 1996 elections, they made it clear [Butler's] days were numbered. Butler, however, had a plan: he convinced foreign minister Alexander Downer that he would ensure US support for an Australian seat on the Security Council. But the US backed Portugal ... One of the reasons for the humiliating defeat was that many Asian and Pacific ambassadors had been alienated by Butler's arrogance in dealing with them.
"By the time Downer moved to sack him, however, Butler had hitched himself to the skirts of Madeleine Albright, then Washington's UN representative. Albright wanted someone to push the CTBT [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty] through the UN General Assembly after the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva had deadlocked due to the intransigence of the five nuclear weapon states ...
"In 1997, Butler was rewarded by the US with the UNSCOM job. Albright got Downer to agree to Butler's appointment. According to Australian diplomatic sources, Downer agreed 'in the fond belief that he would not only be rid of an insufferable and arrogant upstart but also that he would not have to pay him anything. So you can imagine the surprise here when we were told that the government had to pay Butler some $250,000 a year!'".
More than ever, Butler relies on the US to keep his job. Washington's veto on the Security Council is all that prevents Butler being sacked.