The results of the October 4 elections in Greece were a political earthquake that have created a new situation.
The top news is the defeat of New Democracy (ND), the traditional party of the right wing, which has been in power since 2004. With only 33.4% of the vote and 91 seats in parliament (down from 151 in the 2007 elections), ND had the worst showing for the right in Greece since the civil war of 1946-49.
The same evening as the elections, Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis resigned as ND leader.
The crushing defeat of the party has opened up a period of deep political crisis for the right, a crisis that by all indicators will be long lasting. There are at least four candidates to be the new leader of the party —and they can't even agree on how to elect a new leader.
The reasons for the right's collapse are many. The corporate media like to highlight the scandals involving members of Karamanlis's cabinet.
But other reasons proved to be far more serious. In the five-and-a-half years of ND governments, the working class and the youth have accumulated many bitter experiences from the neoliberal reforms of the right.
A youth rebellion broke out last December, after police killed a 15-year-old. The repression with which Karamanlis answered this rebellion has isolated the right from young people.
The most important reason, though, was Karamanlis' response to the economic crisis.
In a September speech, the PM endorsed the need for harsh measures to bring down the national debt and budget deficit. He even used the term "freezing" in relation to wages and pensions.
Instead, this "froze" hundreds of thousands of working people against ND and created, a month before the elections, a wave of outrage against the party.
The winner of the elections is the social democratic party PASOK (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement).
Under the leadership of Georgios Papandreou, the party won 43.9% of the vote and elected 160 members of parliament — a comfortable majority of 10 seats.
PASOK leaders spoke of income redistribution and raising social spending, while condemning the "medieval" conditions in labor relations. They gave attention to environmental matters, speaking of some sort of "green development".
Yet PASOK never assumed any concrete obligations to meet the important demands raised by workers and youth.
This tactic of doubletalk had a dual effect. On one hand, PASOK was recognised by the ruling class as the most suitable alternative to the threat of government instability and political crisis brought on by the rapidly advancing collapse of Karamanlis.
On the other, PASOK became the way to punish Karamanlis, making the social democratic party the beneficiary of popular anger.
But this electoral shift to PASOK was made without any enthusiasm — without creating a popular current for "change".
PASOK received 3 million votes — exactly as many as it got in 2004 when it was defeated by ND and Karamanlis came to power. This numerical paradox can be explained by the drop in voter turnout.
In Greek politics, there is a traditional "over-politicisation" in contrast to other European countries. In the era since the fall of dictatorship in 1974, Greek voter turnout was, on average, about 80%.
But since the elections of 2004 and 2007, it has gradually declined. In the October 4 poll, it dropped to 68%.
This reflects Greek voters' questioning of the two-party system, as has taken place in other countries in the neoliberal era.
This is important for understanding the political dynamics in Greece. The day after the elections, the media said "the country had a strong government", and many added that the total vote captured by the two parties of power remained high (79%).
But this is a numerical game, not a political analysis.
The very evening of the elections, future ministers of PASOK, watching the rapid collapse of ND, admitted that "the political cycle of replacing [parties] in power has narrowed" due to the crisis. And also because of the convergence between social democrats and the right on economic and social policies.
In reality, things are much worse for all of them: the torrent of anger that demolished Karamanlis now confronts PASOK.
For the time being, the angry public is observing the new government, waiting for its first serious moves. But everybody knows the "honeymoon" will be very short.
And a contradictory party like PASOK — following the same policies as Karamanlis, while it is forced to use populist rhetoric — could prove much less resilient than ND to the blows of the movements of workers and the youth.
However, the left in Greece wasted a serious opportunity in these elections. Its total support stayed at about the same level — 13%.
The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) stayed the third party, with a small retreat to 7.5% from 8.2% in earlier elections.
This stagnation shows that its leadership tactics have reached their limits. KKE is a party characterised by its absolute isolation of its forces from the rest of the left and mass movements outside its control, and also complete adherence to Stalinist orthodoxy.
In these elections, the KKE was forced to ask for the support of "other radicals" outside its ranks — without success.
Its more serious decline in the larger working class areas highlights even more its political weakness. Public remarks by KKE general secretary Aleka Papariga that she could be replaced may be the start of internal developments.
SYRIZA, the broad united front coalition of the radical left, got 4.6% of the vote, electing 13 MPs. It registered a small decline from the 5% it won in 2007 — a result seen as a big success at the time.
Despite the drop, the result has been recognised as a victory in the mass media since many polls at the start of the campaign gave SYRIZA less than the 3% minimum for candidates to win seats.
The reason for these low expectations was that SYRIZA appeared to suffer from the pressure put on it by PASOK to achieve a parliamentary majority. PASOK was helped in this by the centre-left orientation of the right-wing of Synaspismos (SYN) — a reformist left party and the largest tendency in SYRIZA.
SYRIZA passed this critical test mostly thanks to the determination of its left-wing supporters, but also because of the politics of its campaign: attacking the political measures of ND in their specifics, condemning the politics of PASOK and demanding a "protective shield" for working people and the youth from the attacks of the bosses.
Activists put out the demands of SYRIZA on a huge scale. These included calls for the abolition of "rented" and "temporary" labor, mass hiring for hospitals and schools, and an increase in real raises for wages and pensions.
This approach put SYRIZA in position to clash with Karamanlis and clearly differentiate itself from the generalities of PASOK.
Also taking part in the elections was an alliance of many organisations of the far left under the acronym ANTARSYA. This grouping got 25,000 votes (0.36%), a low percentage surpassing only extremely sectarian old Stalinist-Maoist groups.
This showing certainly doesn't do justice to the continuous presence and efforts of these comrades in resistance movements. And it is proof that in Greece — as in many European countries — the prerequisite for national electoral tactics for the far left is united front collaboration at a broader level.
The racist, extreme right-wing party LAOS received 5.6% of the parliamentary vote. This is less than it expected given the conditions of collapse of the big party of the right, ND.
Nevertheless, the crypto-fascists of LAOS remain a significant threat. That underlines the importance of the anti-racist struggle that SYRIZA has adopted as one of its main orientations.
.
A further comment must be made about what the European press calls "the triumphant return of PASOK". This is an obvious attempt to prop up the European social democratic parties that have suffered successive electoral defeats.
This euphoria is completely out of touch with reality. Greek capitalism is going through a deep crisis.
The chairman of the Bank of Greece told the newly elected government that the deficit by the end of the year will skyrocket to 12% of gross domestic product. Thus, the harsh policies that Karamanlis dared to propose, and which led to his party's demise, will reappear — this time as the mandatory framework for the policies of the new government.
At the same time, the movements of mass resistance have not retreated from the scene.
The continuous small and big struggles by workers and the youth will be now the real opposition to Papandreou. This opposition from below, large and militant, has already proved it can push "powerful governments" toward collapse.
Two years ago, when PASOK was still in crisis after its electoral defeat, SYRIZA was polling as high as 18%. A section of the base of social democracy had turned its search for hope toward the radical left.
This connection is still possible. Only this time, it won't be in the paper results of opinion polls. It can happen in the streets — in the struggles against the policies of a government that, while speaking about workers and the people, is being shaped by the interests of the bankers and the bosses.
[Reprinted from www.socialistworker.org. Antonis Davenellos is a member of International Workers Left (DEA) and the left coalition SYRIZA.]