BY NORM DIXON
The first of an expected 1100 US marines began landing in southern Afghanistan on November 25, ferried from US ships in the Arabian Sea and equipped with helicopter gunships, artillery, armoured vehicles and Harrier jump jets. As they arrived, the commander of the invading force, Brigadier General James Mattis, theatrically declared, "The marines have landed and now we own a piece of Afghanistan".
While Mattis' MacArthuresque bluster may have stirred the blood of some patriotic Americans eager to see ground troops "kick ass" in Afghanistan, the US deployment is geared as much to shoring up Washington's shaky efforts to impose a reliable pro-Western, post-Taliban regime as it is to achieving its stated goal of finishing off the Taliban's top leaders and Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda.
According to US officials quoted in the November 27 New York Times, US marines "would certainly not lead any attack" on Kandahar, the only significant city still in the hands of the Taliban. The marines' base is about 85 kilometres south-west of Kandahar.
"Their purpose is to establish a forward base of operations to help pressure the Taliban forces, [and] to prevent Taliban and al Qaeda terrorists from moving freely about the country" or escaping into Pakistan or Iran, said US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld.
US officials added that the marines would be able to rapidly launch helicopter gunships and Harrier jets against "emerging" Taliban or al Qaeda targets but it was not expected that marine infantry would engage in large-scale battles.
Nor would the marines take the lead in conducting the dangerous searches of the now-legendary warren of caves in southern and eastern Afghanistan in which bin Laden and his followers are said to be hiding.
According to US Senator Carl Levin, chairperson of the Senate Armed Services Committee, "It will be the Afghan forces that will ultimately be the ones, with our technical assistance, who will be successful in rooting out al Qaeda from those caves".
A senior military officer told the New York Times that the marines, aided by a heavy US bombing campaign, would play a supporting role for "southern opposition forces" battling the Taliban. It is this function that has been largely overlooked in the mainstream press coverage of the marines' insertion.
Northern Alliance
Washington has been attempting to grapple with problems created by the rapidity with which the forces allied to the Northern Alliance have taken control of northern and western Afghanistan in the wake of the Taliban's retreat from Kabul on November 12.
The collapse of Taliban rule allowed the NA-aligned guerilla commanders to take control of most major cities and towns before a pro-Western regime sufficiently beholden to Washington could be put in place.
The US and Britain had hoped to convince NA forces to allow a UN-endorsed peacekeeping force, composed mainly of troops from "Muslim countries", to take control of Kabul and other cities pending UN talks about the creation of a "broad-based, multi-ethnic" interim government.
"Broad-based" and "multi-ethnic" means a government in which political factions within the Pashtun ethnic minority which are friendly to the Pakistan military dictatorship play a major, if not dominant, role. Pashtuns account for around 40% of the Afghan population and predominate in the country's south and east.
The NA-aligned factions are mainly composed of Afghanistan's other ethnic and religious minorities — the largest groups being Uzbeks, Tajiks and Shiite Hazaras — and are concentrated in the north and west. These minorities resent the domination of Afghan politics by a Pashtun political elite — and the discrimination directed against them — that continued until a left-wing people's uprising overthrew the monarchy in 1978.
An important aspect of the 1992-96 intra-mujaheddin civil war that followed the fall of the Peoples Democratic Party government was a struggle by Afghanistan's northern ethnic and religious minorities (which together constitute the majority of the population) to prevent Pashtun domination.
The Pashtun mujaheddin factions, especially the Taliban after 1994, were armed and funded by Pakistan with Washington's approval. Iran, Russia and the former Soviet central Asian republics maintained close military and political ties with the NA throughout the 1990s.
Clearly, Washington would prefer an Afghanistan ruled by a regime with a heavy representation of pro-Pakistan Pashtuns. An administration in which the NA dominates would be too unreliable for Washington's liking.
However, Washington has found itself without a credible alternative Pashtun political or military force that it can promote as a counterweight to the NA — on the battlefield or in the UN-facilitated talks on an interim administration that began in Bonn on November 27.
Quarantine the south
Prior to the marines' insertion, Ismail Khan, the NA-aligned conqueror of the western city of Herat, was threatening to march his forces on Kandahar and the Taliban-controlled southern province of Helmand.
A key goal of the US marines in southern Afghanistan is to discourage a serious Northern Alliance move against Kandahar and to provide a military shield behind which the disparate Pashtun tribal authorities can claim some military and territorial gains, and therefore demand a stronger role in a post-Taliban regime.
For the same reason, US forces also pointedly refused to bomb Taliban-aligned Pashtun tribal militia who were resisting the advance of NA fighters in the town of Maidan Shahr, south-west of Kabul on the main road to Kandahar. After a stalemate lasting several days, the pro-Taliban militia members on November 25 agreed to hand over their heavy weapons and defect to the NA. In return, they were allowed to keep their small arms and retain control of the town.
With the dramatic fall of the northern city of Kunduz to the NA on November 27, Kandahar became the last stronghold of the Taliban. Thousands of Pakistani and Arab Taliban fighters and tens of thousands of Pashtun guerillas are said to be in the city along with the top Taliban leaders, including Mullah Mohammed Omar.
NA leaders in Kabul on November 28 again threatened to march on Kandahar once they had firm control of Ghazni province. Ghazni city is roughly halfway between Kabul and Kandahar.
The British Guardian on November 29 reported that there were conflicting reports that NA fighters may have entered Kandahar province, although that would still put them up to 100 kilometres away from the city itself.
Southern Pashtun tribal leaders — many of whom only yesterday were content with Taliban rule — prefer to try to convince the Taliban to agree to a face-saving transfer of power in Kandahar rather than launch a military attack that they are ill-prepared for and unwilling to mount.
On November 25, 70 Pashtun tribal leaders meeting in Quetta, Pakistan, appealed to the Taliban to surrender. A delegation left to meet with Taliban leaders in Kandahar.
The British Guardian's Jonathan Steele reported on November 19 that the Taliban in Kandahar "were willing to talk to Pashtun notables who had been in contact with them, such as Hamid Karzai and Gul Agha [Shirzai]... The emerging picture is that Kandahar has a tentative cease-fire while furious discussions go on among tribal leaders ... The main issue is whether to let the Taliban keep some power in a coalition arrangement in Kandahar. If so, the Taliban could claim a place in a national government."
US warplanes have continued to carpet-bomb the city and surrounding villages — with devastating civilian casualties that have gone unreported in most of the Western press — to apply pressure to the Taliban leadership to surrender the city. The US marines will now help the anti-Taliban Pashtun enforce the siege of Kandahar from the ground.
Washington's key southern Pashtun allies — royalist tribal leader Hamid Karzai, whose forces have taken control of Orozgan province north of Kandahar, and Gul Agha Shirzai, the former governor of Kandahar province — have managed to convince former Taliban commanders and officials in the provinces of Paktia, Nangahar, Logar and Ghazni to simply swap sides and join the "southern Pashtun opposition".
In Nangahar province, Yunis Khalis, who was Mullah Omar's mentor and commander during the 1980s civil war, has taken charge. Only Helmand and Zabol provinces, to the west and east of Kandahar, are in Taliban hands.
Fighters aligned to Shirzai also captured Takhteh Pol, 40 kilometres south-east of Kandahar, on November 24. By November 26, Pashtun militia moving north had reportedly occupied Kandahar airport and several nearby villages, bringing them within 25 kilometres of the city.
However, this had little to do with their military prowess. As the November 27 Washington Post reported, "Tribal officials said the territorial gains ... have been largely due to US military activity on the ground and in the air. Today's movement toward Kandahar occurred only after intense US air attacks on Taliban positions between Takhteh Pol and Kandahar ... 'The American Special Forces have been ordering air strikes', said an aide to a top tribal leader. 'Then, when the area is clear, they are telling us, 'Come, take this place'.' ... Without the Americans, [Shirzai] would not have taken anything."
Negotiations are underway between Pashtun commanders and Taliban officials for the surrender of Spin Boldak, a key border post across which fuel and food for Kandahar passes.
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) is mediating between the rivals, the November 29 Washington Post reported. The ISI is also reported to be involved in trying to broker a amicable handover of Kandahar. The involvement of the ISI is a belated attempt by Pakistan to regain some influence in Afghanistan after the collapse of its former ally, the Taliban.
The US and Pakistan hope that a viable Pashtun political force can be constructed around Karzai and Shirzai, Taliban turncoats (euphemistically termed "moderate Taliban") and the many other Pashtun tribal militia groups.
Bonn ultimatum
Meanwhile, the talks that began on November 27 in Bonn between the NA and other Afghan factions revealed the paucity of credible non-NA partners for a post-Taliban regime, highlighting Washington and Islamabad's dilemma.
Apart from the NA's 11 delegates, the only other attendees were 11 delegates of the exiled former king Zahir Shah, and five delegates each from two rump groups of Pashtun exiles, one based in Pakistan and another in Cyprus. None control any territory inside Afghanistan (although Hamid Karzai has pledged allegiance to the king).
The NA delegates largely accommodated US and Western demands at the talks without abandoning their claim to the key role in an interim administration.
There is general agreement that the former king will play a figurehead role. Prior to the talks, NA leader and president of the UN-recognised government of Afghanistan, Burhanuddin Rabbani, stated that the NA would accept participation of "moderate" former Taliban in an interim administration. He agreed to abide by the decisions of the Bonn meeting.
The meeting is expected to agree to the formation of an interim council which will organise a loya jirga (grand meeting) that will bring together hundreds of delegates from across Afghanistan. The loya jirga will appoint an interim government that will rule for two years while it writes a new constitution and organises elections.
The factions are also to discuss the formation of a security force to take over from NA fighters in Kabul and other cities. The NA delegates are arguing for an "all-Afghan" force, while the exiled factions want a UN force. Further meetings are likely to be held in Kabul.
At the meeting, Western officials used the corridors to remind the delegates that unless they came up with a governing formula that is acceptable to them, the billions of dollars needed to rebuild the country would be withheld.
German foreign minister and Greens leader Joschka Fischer was appointed to deliver the West's public ultimatum: "This readiness [to provide aid] is linked with clear expectations ... to forge a truly historic compromise that holds out a better future for your torn country and its people".
On the eve of the talks, a Washington Post editorial, likely reflecting US ruling class opinion, offered the NA delegates the following advice — and a not-to-subtle threat: "In the end, however, a stable Afghan solution will require the Northern Alliance leaders to accept the political primacy of southern Pashtuns, while retaining a significant role in the national government, and perhaps dominance over security in the north, where the non-Pashtuns mostly live.
"Though many northern leaders clearly want more than that, US officials hope they will bow to the reality that overplaying their hand will invite a return to the civil war of the early '90s — a conflict that eventually led to their defeat by the Taliban.
"For now, with crucial battles to be fought against al Qaeda, it's worth giving our Afghan allies that chance to be reasonable. Yet, over time, if reason fails, stronger steps should not be ruled out."
From Green Left Weekly, December 5, 2001.
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