Since August 22, cities across Indonesia have been rocked by student-led protests against a proposal to revise the laws governing regional elections, which are due in November. Green Left’s Peter Boyle spoke to Rudi Hartono, the managing editor of a new progressive publication Merdika.id, who joined the protesters in Jakarta.
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What triggered the student protests that have taken place across the Indonesia?
The trigger for these large protests, which are still ongoing, was the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/House of Representatives (DPR) decision to discuss a revision of the Regional Election Law.
Let me provide a brief overview of recent Indonesian politics for some context. After winning the election, the Prabowo [Subianto] and Jokowi [Joko Widodo] coalition — now known as KIM Plus — started redesigning Indonesia's political future without significant opposition. They have embraced all the parties that opposed them in the February 2024 elections, and this strategy has been successful. As a result, the only remaining potential opposition is the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P), the party led by [former President] Sukarno's children.
As the regional elections approach, KIM Plus has managed to build a large coalition involving nearly all parties for the regional elections. The problem is that, in Indonesia, the new Regional Election Law requires [a political party to meet] a 20% seat threshold [in a provincial parliament] for a candidate to run. With this threshold, PDI-P struggles to field candidates.
Consequently, KIM Plus faces no opposition in some regions, leaving the ballot essentially pointless.
Then, suddenly, the Constitutional Court issued a ruling removing this threshold and clarifying the age limit of 30 years for regional head candidates.
This decision was welcomed by many as a victory for democracy. However, just a day later, the DPR suddenly planned a meeting to discuss a revision of the Regional Election Law. For many, this revision seems like a ploy by the DPR to overturn the Constitutional Court’s decision.
This triggered widespread protests.
An “Emergency Alert” was issued, featuring a blue image with the Garuda emblem (the national symbol). The message was that Indonesia is heading towards authoritarianism.
This alert first appeared on Twitter/X by a user named @BudiBukanIntel. He is an influencer who is a critical voice on social and political issues. Then, a photo of this tweet was shared by a very popular presenter in Indonesia, Najwa Shihab. It was subsequently followed by many social media users, activists, academics and celebrities.
This sentiment resonated on social media. Several public figures, especially celebrities, supported the movement. They criticised President Jokowi and the KIM Plus coalition for attempting to overturn the Constitutional Court’s decision, labeling it as a constitutional coup.
The protests were an accumulation of pent-up frustration. Recently, mainstream media have highlighted Indonesia’s worsening economic situation. Unemployment is rising and job opportunities are shrinking. Many Indonesians in the middle class have lost their savings and are economically vulnerable.
Additionally, young people (Millennials and Gen Z), who make up more than half of the population, are anxious about the diminishing job market. With few job opportunities and rampant nepotism in hiring, young Indonesians are particularly sensitive to issues of political dynasties. They are outraged by President Jokowi’s push to have his son run for Vice President by arbitrarily changing laws.
Now, Jokowi is also altering the Regional Election Law to facilitate his second son, Kaesang Pangarep, becoming a gubernatorial candidate in Central Java.
Overall, while the protest movement does address democratic issues. I disagree with some on the left who characterise it as merely bourgeois or bourgeois activism. Besides facing neoliberal economic issues, Indonesia is also grappling with democratic issues: high costs of politics making it accessible only to the wealthy, rising political dynasties, corruption, patron-client relationships, and increasing authoritarian tendencies.
Without addressing these democratic issues, Indonesia cannot progress. As Marx and Lenin have said, while the bourgeoisie benefits from democratisation struggles, it is ultimately the working class that gains more. The leftist movement and working class should leverage the gradually opened democratic space to advance their ideas and political agendas.
How significant is this struggle?
I believe the protests are very significant. First, the DPR and President Jokowi have been forced to comply with the Constitutional Court's decision. This decision opens up broad political space for anyone to run in the regional elections, providing voters with more choices.
For leftist groups, this is also an opportunity to field progressive candidates in regional elections where they have significant vote shares. The Labor Party, which includes many leftist activists, now has a chance to put forward its own candidates in several regional elections.
Second, the success of the protests has pushed back, or at least delayed, the KIM Plus agenda, which had an authoritarian orientation and left no room for opposition. Even though parliamentary opposition is small (possibly only PDI-P remains), street-level opposition is growing and expanding.
Third, this boosts the confidence of civil society movements, including social and leftist movements, which have been significantly weakened over the 10 years of Jokowi’s administration. Jokowi succeeded in drawing many veteran activists to his side, using them to intimidate or undermine social and student movements.
What is your expectation of the political course of the incoming Prabowo government? Will it be different from Jokowi's rule? If so, in what way?
The Prabowo-Gibran government will not differ much from Jokowi's administration. In fact, throughout the campaign and even now, Prabowo has consistently claimed to be a continuation of Jokowi.
Economically, Prabowo will continue the agenda that heavily favours a small group of oligarchs controlling Indonesia’s economy. He will also be very open to foreign investment. I believe this administration will not pursue a people-centric economic agenda.
Prabowo-Gibran inherits a very narrow fiscal space from Jokowi. They inherit foreign debt amounting to IDR 8,338.43 trillion [A$600 billion]. Allocations for debt repayments and interest already heavily burden Indonesia’s state budget. Additionally, due to tax policies favoring the wealthy and business groups, Indonesia’s tax revenue ratio is among the lowest in the world and Southeast Asia.
Politically, Prabowo-Gibran dreams of an Indonesia similar to China, with only one party ensuring political stability. Labour unions and social movements are weakened (considered not part of Indonesian tradition). The press will be controlled and forced under government control. There is now a broadcasting bill that limits investigative journalism and freedom of speech.
Prabowo will also restore the role of the military in politics and business. The National Armed Forces Bill, currently under discussion, would allow the military to reenter political and business life. This would be a severe blow to democracy in Indonesia.
On many occasions, whether in interviews or speeches, Prabowo has shown expressions and statements indicating displeasure with criticism and freedom of speech. He often dismisses these with the term “talkative” (meaning too much talking).
However, with the large protests in recent days, it seems that the Prabowo-Gibran government will begin its term with very slim public support.
Even before this administration has taken office [in November], public opposition has already formed, involving a broad spectrum of labour unions, student movements, women, Indigenous communities, academics, intellectuals, and much of the middle class.
I believe this is a politically favourable situation for the leftist movement in Indonesia to advance its ideas and build progressive political tools with a broad political spectrum. However, to start this, the left must discard dogmatic views, leftist maladies and abstract revolutionary slogans. They must find a common issue to create what Chantal Mouffe terms a “chain of equivalence”, by attracting as many social sectors as possible (youth, workers, farmers, urban poor, intellectuals, academics, middle class and small entrepreneurs) to build a demarcation against the small elite controlling political and economic resources in Indonesia.
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