East Timor: Making amends? Analysing Australia's role in reconstructing East Timor
Edited by Lansell Taudevin and Jefferson Lee
Otford Press, Sydney
253pp, $26.95.
Successive Australian governments have a lot to answer for regarding East Timor's long and arduous struggle for independence — and its record hasn't improved since independence either, as this new book amply demonstrates.
Australia's relationship with Indonesia and East Timor was based upon the principle of "pragmatism", on the denial of the East Timorese people's right to self determination, so that Australia's "national interest" could be best served.
The only ones to benefit from this foreign policy approach were the corrupt generals and businesspeople linked to former dictator Suharto, and their counterparts across the Timor Sea in the business councils of corporate Australia, keen to exploit the oil and gas reserves that belonged to East Timor and to gain greater access to Indonesia's resources and markets.
In Canberra, a circle of bureaucrats and diplomats in the departments of foreign affairs and defence staked their careers on this relationship. They were backed up by writers and journalists in the establishment media who helped con and deceive the Australian public about the struggle for independence in East Timor and the growing fight for democracy in Indonesia.
Few journalists strayed outside the official line supporting Indonesia's "integration" of East Timor, and when they did it was only to raise occasional concerns about human rights abuses.
The rise of the pro-democratic movement in Indonesia and the overthrow of Suharto fuelled and strengthened the resistance in East Timor, with thousands rallying across the country demanding a referendum on independence — and started to shatter illusions in this country about what was taking place there.
There was never any hope of turning this movement back with phoney offers of "autonomy". It could only be done through increased repression and subversion, which began in earnest with the arrival of more Indonesian troops in the latter half of 1998, along with the re-activation and creation of pro-Jakarta militia gangs.
While the arming and training of the militia gangs was taking place, federal government ministers, such as foreign minister Alexander Downer and then defence minister John Moore, parroted the claims of Indonesia's foreign minister Ali Alatas that the East Timorese people were "deeply divided" and that there was a threat of "civil war".
Despite the intelligence information it was receiving, the deception continued throughout 1999, with the government denying the Indonesian military was directly responsible for the militia terror in East Timor and claiming that it was just "rogue" elements involved.
In truth, a carefully planned operation was underway to crush support for independence, masterminded by the top ranks of the Indonesian military, carried out by units like the infamous elite Kopassus commandos.
The two-part special screened on the SBS's Dateline program on May 9 and May 16 confirms previous reports and intelligence leaks that the Australian government knew what was really going on in East Timor, but sought to lie to the Australian public about the extent of its knowledge about what the Indonesian military was up to.
According to army intelligence officer Andrew Plunkett, the information collected on the situation within East Timor prior to the August vote revealed precisely what was taking place and being planned. The government must have been aware of this, he claimed.
"The analysis was that the TNI [Indonesian army] would basically destroy East Timor and they'd use militia as proxies. It was quite clear the link between the militia and TNI and the militia being bit players, small pawns, and it was quite clear that they would kill a lot of people and destroy their infrastructure straight after the autonomy ballot, if it won independence", Plunkett said.
Plunkett believes this information was deliberately suppressed by the higher levels of government.
The Howard government is trying to claim credit for the East Timorese's defiant vote for freedom in the face of unremitting terror. Downer told Dateline: "I think we behaved most honourably throughout 1999. In fact, it's one of the most honourable periods in Australian foreign policy, where we did everything we possibly could to ensure the ballot took place ... At the end of the day, we handled it just right and the proof of that is in the result".
Downer's rosy slant on Australia's role in 1999 glosses over where he and his cabinet colleagues really stood. Right up until the announcment of the referendum result, the government's formal position was to support the continuance of East Timor's integration with Indonesia. It was opposed to the sending of Australian troops to stop the carnage and only did so because it was forced to by the ongoing and increasingly large mass protests in Australia's cities.
The government still refuses to hand over or provide in full the expansive collection of intelligence files documenting human rights abuses conducted by the TNI and the militias to the United Nations transitional administration investigative team and judiciary.
It is opposed to an international war crimes tribunal being established, despite the total failure of the Indonesian legal system to adequately deal with prosecuting Indonesian military figures and militia leaders.
Closer scrutiny of the government's motives reveals its chief concern is to minimise as much as possible its culpability in the destruction and killings in East Timor and to minimise the compensation due to East Timor from the Australian government and big business.
Other than covering-up for the Indonesian military, the Howard government is also shafting East Timor on a number of other fronts.
East Timorese refugees and asylum seekers in Australia were coerced and pressured into leaving Australia for East Timor (or Portugal, in some cases), despite uncertainties about conditions there. The government has also blocked free movement of East Timorese to Australia, many of whom would like to come here for work, health or education reasons or simply to visit relatives.
On the other hand, Australian-based businesses, often with funding and support from government bodies like AusAID and Austrade, have been encouraged to go to East Timor to make the most of reconstruction opportunities. Little of this directly benefits the East Timorese, who are employed for a pittance by Australian-owned firms servicing the well-paid United Nations foreign staff.
Then there is the government's position during the renegotiating of the Timor Gap Treaty, and its attempt to swindle East Timor out of hundreds of millions of dollars of oil and gas royalties.
While recent reports indicate that the government may be preparing to compromise, it has so far adamantly ruled out redrawing the maritime boundary along the median point between Australia and East Timor, as is the norm under international law.
The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor estimates that East Timor could expect to receive around $US100 million to $US500 million in royalties per annum. This dwarfs East Timor's current national budget, projected to run between $US45 million and $US60 million for some time.
Clearly much still needs to be done to support East Timor against the actions of the Howard government.
One attempt to take a critical look at the role of the Australian government was a seminar initiated by the Australia East Timor Association, which was held in Sydney on August 30 last year, the first anniversary of East Timor's vote for independence. Keynote speakers and panels addressed various political and social aspects of East Timor's transition, sparking much discussion and debate.
Out of the seminar grew this book East Timor: Making amends? Analysing Australia's role in reconstructing East Timor. It is wide ranging in the topics it covers, with contributions on the Timor Gap, development and reconstruction and the role of the media being of particular importance.
Making Amends? gives an invaluable insight into the people-to-people links currently underway, with contributions from aid workers and solidarity activists involved in various projects. These chapters show how the huge support for East Timor in 1999 has carried over since, in the form of donations of money and goods, volunteers and a myriad of aid and solidarity projects.
Making Amends? is an important contribution, which sets the record straight on the decades-long betrayal of the East Timorese by both Labor and Coalition governments.