Some 25,000 public sector workers swamped the streets in Hong Kong's central business district on July 9, in a massive show of opposition to galloping privatisation and worsening employment conditions. On the same day, most eligible voters didn't even bother to take part in a highly controlled preliminary election, that will eventually produce six members of the territory's legislature, the third since its 1997 return to Chinese rule.
The protesters came from 18 public sector unions and groups, joined by 12 other unions marching in solidarity, angry about the decreasing job security and continuing decline in working conditions in the public sector. The deterioration has gone hand in hand with the privatisation of public services.
The July 9 action came hard on the heels of protests by thousands in the previous two weeks, calling for a halt to various cuts and scandals in government policies and measures.
Four major public sector unions backed out of the protest, following a meeting a few days earlier with Hong Kong's Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa, joining the Senior Non-Expatriate Officers Association in boycotting the action. These five groups have about 100,000 members, compared to 90,000 members of the unions taking part in the action.
Though participation by workers was far from complete, it was substantial, making the protest the largest of the sector in Hong Kong in many years.
Also breaking a record that day, but in a different direction, was the dismally low voter turnout in a poll for the Election Committee, a body of 800 which in September will fill six out of the 60 seats in Hong Kong's next legislature.
Only 168,000 people, or less than 3% of Hong Kong's six million population, were eligible to vote for the body. Not only are its constituencies based on 35 narrow sectors but they are also weighted in favour of the business sector, professions or other interest groups.
Given the token nature of this "election", it's hardly surprising that only 19.5% (32,823) of the eligible voters cast a vote on July 9, down from 23.4% in 1998.
The participation could have been higher had eight of the sub-sectors been able to muster more than one candidate to run. As that didn't happen, the July 9 election was charged to choose the seats for only 27 sub-sectors. In all, 318 of the committee's 800 seats were already filled — by designated officials, "representatives" chosen by religious bodies and the unopposed candidates.
To no-one's surprise, the winners' list was dotted with top tycoons and other business personalities, most revealingly represented by the inclusion of Li Ka-shing (often dubbed as the richest man in Hong Kong) and his sons — Victor Li Tzar-kuoi and Richard Li Tzar-kai, both of whom head key arms of the Li business empire.
Voters' interest was further eroded by the great confusion over the exact jurisdiction of the committee. Speculation was rampant that the Election Committee will be empowered to choose the chief executive by 2002, a point which Tung's administration has refused to clarify.
The appointment of the chief executive has never been subjected to public scrutiny. A Beijing-appointed Selection Committee of 400 members chose Tung from a list of contestants, but that decision was sealed only with Beijing's approval.
The Selection Committee also chose the first post-handover legislature of 60 seats (officially called the "provisional legislature"), which was replaced in May 1998 by a three-tier legislature of the same size.
In that revamped body, only 20 seats were produced by a popular vote. Thirty others, in the "functional constituency" category, were elected by narrowly based business sectors or professional groups.
A few hundred or even a few dozen votes (including corporate votes, in some cases) were enough in 1998 to deliver victory in many of the functional seats. Some seats were not contested, strongly suggesting behind-the-scene horse-trading. The remaining 10 seats were elected by the Election Committee.
This complicated structure is hardly an accident but rather a design to blur the undemocratic nature of the legislative body, the new version of which will be produced in September.
There are promises under Hong Kong's Basic Law (its de facto constitution) that there is an "ultimate" goal to make all seats of the legislature popularly elected and to remove all functional seats after the first three terms of the post-handover legislature.
But details are lacking, and there's the constant threat that Beijing will override the rights of the Hong Kong Final Court of Appeal to interpret the Basic Law, following a case last year which Beijing said was "exceptional".
BY EVA CHENG