Max Lane
Despite what some media may tell us, the 2004 Indonesian election results indicate that there is no nostalgic swing to the past, but instead a popular rejection of the elit politik.
Not a single major political party has increased its vote. Golkar, despite its massive funding, its so-called "new image" and its ability to get parliamentary speaker Akbar Tanjung off on his corruption conviction, will probably see its vote drop slightly. The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) vote has collapsed from 33% in 1999 to around 18%.
In Jakarta the vote for the PDIP and Golkar collapsed to 13% and 8% respectively. New players, the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) and Partai Demokrat (PD), scored more than 20% each. It is possible that all the old mainstream parties will not achieve much more than 30% between them in Jakarta.
The Jakarta region, home to more than 10 million people, is where unemployment, the rising cost of living and social stress is most intense. It is where the opposition movement to Suharto took off.
The huge vote for the PKS and PD represented rejection of the old. They are indeed new players, with a new and serious base in Jakarta and, given their 7% national vote, a block of votes each in the parliament.
There was much pre-election media chatter of a nostalgic swing back to the past based on a popular desire for "stability". But most people are concerned about socio-economic stability — not political stability.
The Megawati government was a relatively stable government pursuing a consistent set of policies throughout its term of office. But these policies resulted in instability for most people — employment uncertainty, price uncertainty, uncertainty of access to medicines and hospitals and to higher and vocational education.
The blame for this uncertainty is placed on a political culture of self-enrichment and power grabbing.
However, neither the PKS nor the PD have yet shown that they are in fact substantially different from the old. At no time during the last five years has Bambang Yudhoyono, for example, indicated any disagreement with the basic social and economic strategy of the Megawati government. The PKS, as part of the parliament's Reformation Fraction, has supported most of the conservative bills the government put to parliament, including the latest water privatisation bill.
It is unclear how the rejection of elit politik will impact on the presidential elections. The only visible presidential candidate with any real prospect of being seen as something "new" and "different" is Yudhoyono.
It is likely, however, that he will enter into negotiate with forces such as Golkar or the National Awakening Party (PKB) of Abdurrahman Wahid. This will weaken his credentials. The PKB is also a party of compromise with the elite politik, despite recruiting some outspoken NGO figures.
Because the Suharto regime was unable to create national unity, elite politik parties are mostly regionally based, including the PD, which comes from Jakarta. It is yet unknown how well Yudhoyono will go elsewhere.
The increased focus on Yudhoyono will challenge him. His star has been dimmed by a recent call for a pardon for Suharto and there are rumours that he will take a Golkar minister, Yusuf Kalla, as his vice-presidential running mate.
The PKS may support a figure from one of the existing old parties, such as Amien Rais from the National Mandate Party (PAN). PAN's vote has also dropped down to below 7%. The PKS has already declared a policy of free primary education.
It is a reflection of the political weaknesses of the left that the PKS and PD benefited from popular discontent.
The best chance for a left and democratic presence in the elections was through the National Coalition (KN) formed in mid 2003. However, the National Bull Awakening Party (PNKB) and the Pioneer Party quite the coalition. These parties got less than 2% of the vote each.
The Peoples Democratic Party (PRD) initiated the Party of United Popular Opposition (POPOR), which included a large number of local worker, peasant and democratic rights organisations. However, debates about whether to boycott the elections slowed the development of this party and it was unable to qualify to contest the election.
Many student activists continued to advocate an electoral boycott, a campaign which has fallen on deaf ears among the mass of the population. While there has been some large scale non-voting in several areas, this seems mainly due to problems flowing from faulty census collection.
The NGOs concentrated on a media campaign calling on people to not to vote for certain specific politicians, but it had a minimal impact without media coverage of the list of names.
Without a left democratic party offering a clear alternative, the people's search for something new and better will be ultimately be frustrated. Whether Yudhoyono or the PKS can get away with presenting themselves as "new and better" between now and the presidential election is unclear. What is clear is that any new government sticking to the old social and economic strategies will be unable to meet the people's expectations. It will not be long into 2005 that rejection of old parties may turn into rejection of new government, especially in Jakarta.
[Max Lane is a visiting fellow at the Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, West Australia and chairperson of Action in Solidarity with Asia and the Pacific. Visit <http://www.asia-pacific-action.org>.]
From Green Left Weekly, April 21, 2004.
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