The left and NGOs in Palestine

March 25, 1998
Issue 

By Ahmad Nimer

The collapse of Stalinism in the late 1980s and early '90s has resulted in a widespread rethinking of the notion of revolutionary politics and in particular the concept of state power. This discussion has resulted in numerous divisions on the left at an international level, particularly within large parties, some of which were previously associated with Stalinist politics.

This response has had a positive side. It has led, in some cases, to renewed collaboration on the left and a rejection of sectarianism. There are significant currents which have retained a revolutionary approach to politics beyond mere symbolism, attempting to link this approach with the daily concerns of working people, whilst also encouraging the involvement of new activists — particularly youth — in the struggle.

However, more recently, this approach has been overshadowed by a general rejection of party politics and embracing of "new forms of struggle". In many countries, this has been conceptualised as "building the institutions of civil society" and "strengthening the rule of law and democracy".

In practice, this often means building NGOs — with significant support from funding agencies located in imperialist countries and at the expense of political movements.

This process has been particularly significant in the West Bank and Gaza, where a general crisis of the left has been paralleled by a rapid growth in the number of NGOs.

Civil society

The vice-president of the Palestinian Council for Justice and Peace, Dr Allam Jarrar, writes in the September issue of the Israel and Palestine Political Report: "The most important role during the current and future political development is for Palestinian NGOs to contribute in the building of civil society in Palestine ...

"[This objective] is essential to the formation of a fully democratic and participative Palestinian society. Only when the Palestinian community is involved in decision making, is able to influence policy formation, is active in all political aspects that affect daily life, will a truly democratic process be initiated.

"The building and strengthening of civil society will also contribute to the process of modernizing the Palestinian society. Modernization and democratization at the community level will guard against that kind of social disruption which creates the fertile breeding ground for fanaticism and extremism."

While Jarrar does not explicitly define the term civil society (very few of its proponents do), its use has become widespread in the literature of NGOs and the left. It is necessary to briefly examine the evolution of the concept and its relationship to the current international context of neo-liberalism. The approach embodied in this term has become so widely accepted that it is no longer theoretically conceptualised, but taken as an assumed truth.

In general, civil society is taken to be that part of society between the level of the state and the individual. It has been used to encompass a wide variety of institutions such as unions, youth groups, women's organisations, educational and religious formations, businesses and even sporting clubs.

Much of the criticism directed at left parties in the past has focused on their lack of attention to the institutions of civil society, claiming they were too concerned with obtaining state power.

South Africa has been one of the clearest examples of this debate. Joe Slovo, a senior leader of the South African Communist Party (SACP), argued that "Lenin ... did not address in any detail, the nature of established socialist civil society ... under the guise of Leninism, the lack of democracy was given a permanent place in civil society."

Skenjani Roji, an editorial board member of the African Communist, journal of the SACP, states: "Lenin's State and Revolution ... [had] little appreciation for the historical significance of the role of civil liberties and a vibrant civil society".

In short, the basis for the argument is that previous left practice has been characterised by a "statism". Democracy should be located in civil society, which is now seen as the primary site for contesting power.

Several voices have challenged this view and its implicit equation of Stalinism with Leninism. These critics point out that civil society itself is rife with class contradictions, and democracy can't be separated from which class has state power. The state itself is the political expression of the social relations in society, and control of civil society by the working class is not possible under a capitalist state.

The civil society approach ignores the reality of class-divided societies. It obscures the real nature of democracy and treats it as a principled, de-classed set of political and social rights, autonomous from the structural class realities.

It ignores the fact that all states act in the interests of particular classes, preferring to concentrate on an individualistic rights-based view of democracy. An approach that avoids the question of state power fails to take account of how and in whose interest decisions are being made. This leads to mere service provision or complaining about human rights violations, without the active involvement of people in seeking change.

From mobilisation to services

The identification of a similar trend within the Palestinian left which has rejected a class approach to political struggle is not a new revelation. Discussion about civil society began in the post-Oslo period within the NGO community.

As Rema Hammammi, a lecturer at Birzeit University in the West Bank, has written, "It is a defeated and marginalised Palestinian left that has introduced the term civil society into local political culture — ironic since the left has in many ways conceptualized it similarly to the 'good governance' model, albeit without the stress on free markets. As such, in the current context of Palestinian history, the discussion of civil society amounts to a discourse of defeat."

There are now more than 1000 NGOs in the West Bank, the majority of which were formed in the early 1990s. Many of these advocate strengthening democracy and building civil society. In practice this has led to the de-politicisation of Palestinian society, replacing the role of mass struggle with professional bodies that seek funds to hold workshops and conduct training courses and conferences, to advocate rather than mobilise.

The development of this approach can be traced historically through the evolution of the left (particularly its communist element) and the NGO movement.

The first NGOs arose during the British Mandate period before 1948. They were largely charitable institutions run by wealthy classes, which determined their conservative service-oriented approach. Despite their numerical weight in the NGO sector, they remain politically insignificant.

The current NGO movement can be dated from the late '70s following the Camp David Accords in 1977 and the invasion of Lebanon in 1982.

Following these two events, the PLO aimed at strengthening support for the national movement within the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This movement was initially characterised by a mass mobilisation approach, focusing on worker and student movements, voluntary work projects and organising women. The Palestine Communist Party (PCP) played a significant role — it was not a part of the PLO — compared to Fatah, which largely depended on funding through the Jordanian regime.

After the intifada, NGOs began to suffer from the decline of the mass movement which had enabled them to subsume the contradiction between grassroots, popular organisations and elite, professional bodies. In part this stemmed from the requirements of foreign funding organisations, which began to replace PLO funds. Again it was the PCP which led the way; it needed to make links with foreign donors more urgently than other factions which were part of the PLO.

The early '90s marked the definitive transition from mobilisers to service-oriented institutions and talk of building civil society. A key reason for this is the effect of foreign funding.

The key left parties in Palestine — the Palestine Communist Party (PCP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) — had a plethora of NGOs under party control. However, the large influx of foreign funds (particularly from European countries) which followed the signing of the Oslo Accords in September 1993 created the material basis for a social layer whose interests were no longer identified with the left.

Despite the widespread deception that funds from European countries were politically neutral, this was clearly not the case. Funding depended upon an acceptance of Oslo and a rejection of political mobilisation.

Funds are generously distributed to provide legal services, carry out research or encourage "self-help" programs in agriculture and small business. One US organisation has even distributed funds to NGOs to carry out democracy workshops with the aim of "teaching" Palestinians to respect the law.

Key leaders of the left found themselves with a large amount of money, earning wages many times those of the average Palestinian. Whereas previously they had spent years in prison or on the run from the Israeli army, they now found themselves dining with ambassadors and speaking at international conferences.

Perhaps most importantly, they now had a social stability which was denied to most Palestinians.

This process clearly affected the left and its ability to mobilise people against the occupation and provide an opposition to Oslo. Directors of NGOs began to distance themselves from party politics and adopt what is derisively called "mudeer (manager) syndrome".

Instead of an active participant in the struggle, the Palestinian population is treated as a passive "constituency" by the NGO movement. Information dissemination replaces the active mobilisation of people, whether here or overseas.

A good example of this is the case of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. It is widely acknowledged that many of these prisoners, particularly the administrative detainees, who are held without trial or charge, represent an alternative political leadership critical of the direction of the Oslo process. Both the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority prefer to see them in jail rather than actively participating in struggle and challenging the status quo.

Press releases or a campaign?

The response of NGOs, much of whose leadership also spent time in prison during the intifada, is to issue press releases demanding the release of the prisoners and respect for the law, to visit prisoners, to issue reports and provide legal services.

While these are important functions, they cannot replace active campaigning that involves the Palestinian population (and sympathetic Israelis).

An instructive contrast is the recent campaign in Indonesia following the arrests of key political opponents of the Suharto dictatorship. Mass demonstrations were organised at political trials and outside government offices. The trials themselves were used to argue against the Suharto regime. International solidarity actions were organised, with the direct encouragement of political forces in Indonesia, in countries ranging from Australia to Europe.

This is not to say that letter writing and press releases were not a part of the campaign, but rather that a combination of tactics aimed to draw people into activity and raise political consciousness.

In Palestine, arrests are treated as a legal issue to be tackled on an individual basis through the courts, international letter writing campaigns and appeals to apparently enlightened foreign governments.

It can be argued that NGOs should not and cannot replace the role of political organisations. While this is certainly true, the problem lies in the fact that the strategies advocated by NGOs have become almost the sole strategy of much of the left.

Indeed, both here and in other countries, much of the leadership of NGOs were previously activists in the left. In the Philippines, a section of the Communist Party, known as the Popular Democrats, left the party to concentrate on building NGOs.

This phenomenon is even more significant in the Palestinian movement than in other countries, for a number of reasons.

The relative strength of the left in other struggles, e.g. Philippines and South Africa, is much greater. In both of those countries, large left parties remain with wide levels of popular support.

The PLO no longer remains as a national liberation force. It has transformed itself into the Palestinian Authority and is controlled by a comprador bourgeoisie which works closely with the Israeli and US bourgeoisies. The PA has no interest in the active mobilisation of people except for narrow, conjunctural interests.

The level of discussion, in Palestine, regarding questions of national liberation, state power and methods of organisation is much lower in comparison to other countries.

The occupation remains and has indeed strengthened as a result of the Oslo process. There has been no significant victory for the left but rather defeat.

The level of working-class organisation is weak. The Palestinian trade union movement is highly factionalised, and there is little independent mobilisation outside of the PA.

Neo-liberalism

The proliferation of service-oriented NGOs is a result of these weaknesses but also contributes to the continuing depoliticisation of society. As Samir Amin has recently pointed out, this phenomenon is well suited to the needs of imperialism:

"Generally speaking, then, actually existing contemporary capitalism works within a system of low intensity democracy. Postmodernist ideology seeks to justify this situation by denigrating major struggles over fundamental choices and choosing instead to laud the management of daily life at a ground level. The proliferation of NGOs is to large extent an answer to this strategy of depoliticization of the peoples of the world. Far from constituting the basic structure of a powerful civil society emerging to face the state, these reorganizations accompany the management of society by the dominant forces of capital."

When a significant layer of left leadership take on the supposedly apolitical role of an NGO leadership, it undoubtedly affects the state of the left.

It is easy to rationalise with such statements as "At least we're still active", "We're providing good information to the international community" or more sophisticated arguments based on notions of civil society and building democratic institutions. However, it leads to the de-politicisation of wider society as elite institutions provide services which replace mass involvement in struggle.

Perhaps the recent example of Palestinian hunger striker Itaf Alayan is instructive. Itaf was arrested late last year and imprisoned in administrative detention. The courageous strike by Itaf, and her declaration of "freedom or death", inspired many Palestinians and those in solidarity.

Scores of NGOs released reports on her condition, visited her and issued press releases. PA-affiliated Arabic newspapers carried her picture on the front page, and several demonstrations were organised.

However, despite the rhetoric of the Palestinian Authority, these mobilisations were short-lived and occurred while representatives of the PA visited Alayan and pleaded with her to stop her strike.

One of the most serious problems resulting from the absorption of much of the left into NGOs is that attempts at mobilisation are left to the Palestinian Authority. People are organised and mobilised, but sporadically and for the particular tactical interests of the PA leadership. Whenever these demonstrations threaten to grow beyond the control of the authority, they are silenced.

A good example is the demonstrations which occurred during the recent US military build-up in the Persian Gulf. Following US and Israeli pressure, Palestinian Police Chief Ghazi Jibali issued orders banning demonstrations and was broadcast on TV telling his officers, "Break the necks of demonstrators".

The people who previously would have organised and led such demonstrations now sit in airconditioned offices issuing press releases condemning Jibali's order as "a violation of the right to freedom of expression".

[This article is based on one the author wrote for News From Within, a left-wing magazine published in Jerusalem by the Alternative Information Centre.]

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