'No surrender!': East Timor guerilla leader

May 22, 1996
Issue 

'No surrender!': East Timor guerilla leader

"There will be no surrender. We will fight to the last drop of blood", says DAVID ALEX, one of the most wanted men in East Timor.

At war for 20 years, Alex has killed more Indonesian soldiers than he cares to remember. He is regional commander of the eastern central sector of the Democratic Republic of East Timor's defence forces, FALINTIL.

Last August year Alex granted an interview to two Australian journalists, JOHN MARTINKUS and DANIEL PEDERSEN. That videotaped interview was smuggled into Australia early this year. Despite Indonesian claims that the guerillas are a spent force this interview indicates that they are not merely still active, but on the offensive.

Last year the bands of guerillas under David Alex's command killed about 30 Indonesian soldiers in different actions.

Alex has seen the war change from a conventional front-line conflict into a sporadic series of cat and mouse engagements since 1975. That year he was a junior commander among the eastern sector force — a force 800 strong.

He offered an untold account of 1995: "I cannot tell you the exact number of engagements, but I can tell you there were many all over the national territory.

"In January, at Viqueque, one of our guerilla fighters was killed — a boy named Bibileu." Again Viqueque, June: "... on the west side of the village, Indonesian troops suffered losses and a vehicle is destroyed".

In July the guerillas mounted an offensive and Indonesian soldiers were killed in an ambush near the village of Vermasse.

Vermasse was the scene of another heavy engagement in August, in the wake of the wounding of the local Indonesian military commander and subsequent reprisal killings of two brothers, sons of the village chief.

Further east, in the traditional guerilla stronghold of Los Palos, Timorese conscripts and Indonesian soldiers were attacked and two weapons captured. Then, on the road between Tutuala and Los Palos in March, 10 Indonesian soldiers were cut down in an attack on a military convoy.

Tutuala is a major Indonesian base at the far eastern tip of the island. Its establishment in 1990 and the subsequent Indonesian military offensives in the area forced a dispersal of FALINTIL troops, some into areas like Liquicia, Ermera, Maliana and Suai (west and south of Dili)

Says Alex: "There has been a spread of the FALINTIL presence and activities all over the national territory. Four years ago our presence was limited; today we have physical presence and the number of activities has increased.

"It's a permanent and constant presence."

This is backed by his account of an attack by the guerillas in the village of Hatulia, west of Dili in the Ermera region, in which Indonesian soldiers were killed.

The casualties continue right across the territory, but from Alex's account, last year there were far fewer on the FALINTIL side.

FALINTIL is an acronym for "Forcas Armadas De Libertacao Nacional De Timor Leste". "FALINTIL are those who are in the mountains with weapons in their hands fighting the Indonesian army", said Alex.

Media coverage of the conflict from the Indonesian side is minimal, restricted to the occasional announcement of a guerilla's death or capture.

This statement from Colonel Mahidin Simbolon — Commander of Indonesian forces in East Timor — on December 28, 1995, was typical: "Two members of Fretilin, a security disturbance movement, have voluntarily surrendered to local security forces in the province". Simbolon added that the province was still in a Christmas mood. No mention was made of an ambush on December 1 — reported by Portuguese Radio One in Lisbon on December 11 — in which FALINTIL forces between Los Palos and Viqueque killed at least 30 Indonesian soldiers and captured their weapons, according to an East Timorese source.

Throughout the 20-year conflict, the Indonesian military has never released its own casualty figures.

David Alex said Indonesia last year abandoned the use of tanks and mortar bombardment. Light automatic weapons were now favoured in an attempt to quell nagging losses.

This move has been coupled with special forces (Kopassus) offensives. The latest report of such an operation — by Australian journalist Sue Neales — was in September 1995, from the central highlands area. This was confirmed by Alex, who referred to a build-up of Indonesian troops in that area at the time of the reports.

This year the war moves into its third decade. The prolonged resistance has been made possible only by an essential harbouring of resources.

David Alex explains: "FALINTIL has its own strategy of action, a strategy that infers fight with wisdom, save the men and material. To fight with wisdom means to attack only the weak parts of the enemy and avoid their strong positions."

Alex would not be pinned down on FALINTIL's exact number of troops. He preferred to say that for FALINTIL, in the mountains, these tactics are working well and ensuring their survival. But in the towns and villages of East Timor, the daily harassment of the people continues.

"The youth today are still being persecuted, tortured, imprisoned and some of them murdered. On August 24, Indonesian soldiers from Battalion 406 assassinated two members of the Viqueque population in the Nuanurak village and wounded another."

The human rights violations continue. "The youth continue to be followed, bashed and arrested."

Alex went on to explain tactics employed by the Indonesian military: "New [military] arrivals control the population, search their houses and repress any attempt from the population or youth to protest against the actions of Indonesian soldiers. "There is strict control in the night and houses are patrolled to monitor any discussions.

"This practice is normal in Indonesia's new soldiers. They are here to oppress and at the same time adapt themselves to their new environment", he said.

It is little wonder that support for FALINTIL remains high. Food supplies in the highlands are always scarce; sometimes one meal a week keeps FALINTIL alive. But, it is explained, some of the subsistence farmers — who make up much of the rural population — plant excess crops that are left for discreet harvesting by FALINTIL.

The general populace is supportive of FALINTIL's resistance. A clandestine network was able to ferry communications to us directly from the guerillas in a matter of a day or two, wherever we were in the territory.

Within two days of entering the territory we were contacted by a clandestine operative of our "friends in the forest". He knew our names and what we were there for, and found us even though we were unable to stay at the hotel designated for rendezvous.

Word that we wished to speak to the leaders of the resistance had rebounded from a lounge room in suburban Brisbane via encoded phone messages to Dili. For those who carried the message at the other end, discovery would have meant imprisonment and torture.

At the time of our visit to East Timor (late July and early August), which Amnesty International described as a period of heightened tension, David Alex and his band were on the run. Because of Indonesian troop movements in the Baucau area, Alex deemed it too dangerous for all concerned to meet in the mountains under likely threat of Indonesian ambush.

After the loss of valuable personnel (a guide, translator and many others) in the aftermath of their first interview with a foreign journalist, Australian radio reporter Robert Domm, in 1990, they are understandably cautious.

As instructed, we hurriedly purchased a videotape and spent all night preparing an interview that was to be videotaped on our behalf by a FALINTIL courier. Almost six months later, the interview arrived in Australia.

The guerillas fight with captured weapons, wear captured Indonesian uniforms and buy rubber boots from Indonesians during the wet season.

Their campsites are little more than clearings created by tying back low level forest growth. Upon release of the undergrowth, the site can be left in a relatively undisturbed state. Guerillas relax under the shade of tarps hung low in the bush, writing letters to their families, packaging small gifts to be couriered back to their respective villages.

Many of the fighters are teenagers. But there are a few who have been hiding in the mountainous interior of the island, operating as East Timor's defence force, for 20 years.

During the 20-year occupation these men have seen the population reduced by almost a third through starvation and mass slaughter, and a new generation of Indonesian military come with the aim of eradicating them.

David Alex is concluding. He is asked for a message from FALINTIL, the forgotten fighters in the mountains of East Timor. He offers a simple message of solidarity to East Timorese refugees scattered across the globe: "The message I want to give my compatriots outside East Timor is unity and to urge them to bear in mind the objective of independence for East Timor.

"Secondly, I would like them to do everything in their power to mobilise the international community to support the fight in East Timor."

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