By Poul Funder Larsen
After the onslaught on parliament Yeltsin is in a formal position of absolute power, as all other major political players at the centre are either dissolved, suspended or banned.
The phoney elections in December are not likely to alter this state of affairs. With several opposition leaders in prison, a ban on opposition parties and their papers, and firm control over the electronic media and the organisation of the polling Yeltsin has little to fear from this kind of "free elections" — strongly reminiscent of the "elections" of the Soviet period.
However the alliance that stands behind Yeltsin is broad and fragile, and the problems it is facing immense.
The so-called economic "reform" has thus far consisted of zigzags between attempts at implementing monetarist orthodoxy and half-baked measures of state intervention and protectionism. The result is well known: a severe depression combined with total disarray in the fiscal and monetary spheres.
The Yeltsinites have been blaming this on "resistance" on the part of the Central Bank and parliament. However parliament has had virtually no direct influence on economic decisions, and lately the Central Bank has sided with Yeltsin.
The problems of economic policy are not just a matter of conjunctural political fluctuations. The process of converting the bureaucratic command economy is fraught with contradictions as different parts of the bureaucracy try to defend their interests, and the social formations of the Soviet period, still very much in place, counteract the attempts at pressing through an IMF-style reform.
The liberalisation so far has clearly benefited layers of speculative capital, usually linked to former nomenklatura circles and state structures. These will also benefit by the expected speeding up of privatisation, to the detriment of state industry. The liberals are now calling for "radical measures" to be taken, but in spite of numerous earlier proclamations in this vein they have not been able to take the "shock therapy" to its extreme conclusions.
A case in point is the issue of bankruptcies in state industry, where in spite of almost two years of liberal reform not one single enterprise has been forced to close down. This will undoubtedly become a major testing ground in the continuing battle between "monetarists" and "industrialists" inside the government. However, bankrupting state firms, introducing mass unemployment, could lead to the social explosions that the Yeltsinites clearly fear.
The bizarre scenes of open warfare in central Moscow testify to the spectacular decomposition of the Russian state apparatus. This breakdown of the state casts doubt upon Yeltsin's ability to implement the different (and very often contradictory) policies that he is proposing.
The decisive test will be his ability in the medium term to find common ground with the regional elites, whose loyalty to the centre is clearly diminishing and in many cases overshadowed by the interest in regional self-determination (at least in an economic sense). If Yeltsin cannot work out a lasting compromise with the regions, he will hardly be able to stabilise his rule. Even though the armed forces sided with him in the confrontation with parliament, they are not likely to be ready for a series of protracted confrontations in the regions.
The armed forces will undoubtedly demand to be paid for services rendered. When the different parties claim payment for their support, and choices have to be made, Yeltsin's bloody victory could soon turn sour.